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Modern biotechnologies are among the reasons explaining the new focus 
on the idea of human dignity in public, political and scientific discourses. Topics 
being debated range from assisted reproduction, cloning, genetic diagnostics 
and genetic intervention, neuroprosthetics, cyborgs or artificial life all the way 
to visions of ‘transhumanism’ or ‘posthumanity’. With their potential for bringing 
about radical transformations, advanced biotechnologies are forcing the notion 
and boundaries of what is human to be revisited. The biological foundations of 
humankind are more and more accessible, can be modified in a targeted way, 
and thus become the object of decisions. Naturalistic self-descriptions are being 
questioned and replaced by forms of description which are explicitly culturally 
constructed. We have to rethink the very question of what it means to be human 
and how we are to construct human boundaries or the difference between 
human beings and their environment. This creates a new background for the 
normative concepts of human rights, rights of the individual and human dignity. 
Through reference to the dignity of a human being and to the idea of dignity, 
the concept of human dignity implies notions attached to what constitutes being 
human. This fundamental meaning is supported by the multifarious traditions 
of human dignity, by its function as a key concept in interdisciplinary debates 
and not least by its prominent status in legal texts and discourses. Views of the 
role of human dignity, though, could not be more divergent. The conviction that 
dignity is an essential normative concept is juxtaposed with criticism that it is 
useless, nebulous, incoherent or even reactionary.
This article starts by providing an overview of significant biotechnological 
fields and visions as well as of essential discussions referring to human dignity. The 
analysis identifies core problems and new challenges regarding human dignity 
and its use as an argument (I.). Since biotechnologies and the societal discourse 
on them develop, approaches to human dignity and potential violations become 
more nuanced (I. A-H.). The second part examines, particularly with regard to 
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new challenges of biotechnologies, legal contexts of human dignity, especially 
texts and documents enshrining human dignity (II. A.), legislation (II. B.), the 
reasoning of courts (II. C.) and scientific discourses (II. D.). In the final part of this 
article, I will focus on the need to contextualize and differentiate the concept of 
human dignity – a concept that is probably more obviously than ever before a 
social construction as well as an extraordinarily complex legal conception (III.). 
Biotechnologies will prove to be a productive field of reference for discourse 
about human dignity, and the idea of human dignity is by no means useless.
I – FIELDS, VISIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In public discourse, biotechnologies are often contrasted in a sweeping 
manner with human dignity as a normative measure. However, biotechnologies 
cover numerous fields as well as different practices. Considering the word stem 
‘bíos’ their fields encompass all areas of biological organisms or processes, for 
instance, manufacturing particular products, developing new species of plants, 
creating novel food, constructing bacteria or cloning animals. Even if the topic of 
human dignity confines the focus to the human being (while the question of how 
to describe the boundaries has to be kept in mind), the fields are wide-ranging and 
quite heterogeneous. At a fundamental level, we can observe groundbreaking 
developments, such as more and more sophisticated assisted reproduction or 
the ongoing construction and decoding of DNA structures1, followed by the 
emergence of gene diagnostics or genome editing. Further biotechnologies, data 
processing and information technologies, neurotechnologies, nanotechnology, 
robotics and synthetic biology have entered the picture, and the synergies 
between different technologies are accelerating change. With regard to the 
increasing accessibility and modifiability of the biological foundations of 
humankind, which had previously seemed to be a self-evident given, the core 
of advanced biotechnologies may be described as ‘the potential to alter and, to 
a degree, to control the phenomena of human life’2 or as the ‘management of 
life’3 and, moreover, as the creation of life in the sense of targeted interventions 
in previously ‘natural’ functions. The manufacture of synthetic life shows that 
even the familiar distinction between technology and life is becoming blurred4. 
1 The familiar double helix model is a limited scientific construction, see for further developments RN Irobalieva, 
JM Fogg, DJ Catanese, T Sutthibutpong, M Chen, AK Barker, SJ Ludtke, SA Harris, MF Schmid, W Chiu and L 
Zechiedrich, ‘Structural Diversity of Supercoiled DNA’ (2015) 6 Nature Communications 8440, doi: 10.1038/
ncomms9440.
2 The President’s Council on Bioethics (ed), Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness 
(Washington D.C., 2003) 2.
3 T Vidalis, ‘Meeting Darwin: The Gradual Emergence of Biolaw’ (2009) 6
 Journal of International Biotechnology Law 221, 222 ff.
4 See, with differentiations, A Grunwald, Technikzukünfte als Medium von Zukunftsdebatten und 
Technikgestaltung (Karlsruhe, KIT Scientific Publishing, 2012) 177 ff.
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At a more concrete level, however, each field involves a wide range of different 
issues and areas of application.
Beside these requirements for more concrete specification, biotechnologies 
encompass different praxes. We may distinguish between technical methods 
or applications and technologies as scientific knowledge, although there is no 
clear-cut boundary between them. In addition, we can distinguish between 
technologies which can be applied today and technologies which are envisaged 
in future scenarios. If we assume that technologies are embedded in society, 
‘biotechnologies’ are not defined in terms of technical knowledge alone. 
Comprehensive knowledge about biotechnologies is produced in society in 
general, as well as in various scientific disciplines5. This is all the more true 
when considering practices that are already being applied, scenarios based on 
available knowledge, and prognoses or futuristic visions. The latter can, even 
in the form of science fiction novels, promote technical ideas; but they cannot 
be regarded as scenarios which are certain to become reality in the future. The 
multitude and convergence of technologies and the broad spectrum ranging from 
unproblematic to widely rejected applications characterize biotechnologies just 
as much as the scope extending from applied techniques all the way to futuristic 
predictions and the plurality of knowledge, which is both a factor in and a 
product of the discussions.
Precisely this complexity makes biotechnologies one of the most 
interesting reference fields for discourse about human dignity. Although this 
is not always the case such questions can involve issues related to the very 
existence of humankind and also cause matters which had previously been 
regarded as self-evident truths to be contingent. Additionally, biotechnologies 
are advancing, many different fields and areas of application have already 
been developed, and the discussions are becoming more and more nuanced. 
Hence, the notion of human dignity and potential violations must also be more 
clearly delineated. The following analysis explores how human dignity is used 
in debates about particularly relevant biotechnologies.
A. AssIsted reproductIon, especIAlly surrogAcy
Assisted reproduction suggests itself as a starting point. Discussions 
can draw upon more or less established practices as well as imaginable ones. 
Assisted reproduction already encompasses a variety of different approaches: 
In-vitro fertilization and the subsequent transfer of the embryo into the uterus, 
5 cf A Grunwald, ‘Philosophy and the Concept of Technology – On the Anthropological Significance of Technology’ 
in A Grunwald, M Gutmann and E Neumann-Held (eds), On Human Nature (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 
Springer, 2002) 179 ff, with broader considerations on the concept of technology.
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cryopreservation of gametes or fertilized egg cells for the purpose of a transfer 
at a later date (‘social freezing’), sperm and egg cell donation or surrogacy. At 
times, even the technical nature and the artificiality of procreation are regarded 
as problematic because they are said to lead to a situation where new human 
life is no longer created in a ‘natural’ way and as the result of chance, but is 
instead planned and ‘made’, or because it is said that no ‘natural’ mother-child 
bonding can occur6. Mostly, however, it is the way the people involved, their 
bodies and their psychological and social needs are treated which dominates 
discussions of human dignity.
In this respect, surrogacy in particular is under discussion. There are 
different types of surrogacy. A genetic surrogate is inseminated naturally or 
artificially and carries the baby for the intended parents. In gestational surrogacy, 
the egg and sperm of the intended parents or of donors are used for in-vitro 
fertilization, and the embryo is placed into the womb of the surrogate. Globally 
speaking, surrogacy now numbers among the widely employed reproductive 
technologies7. At the center of issues concerning human dignity is the woman 
whose body is used for a pregnancy, with all the associated intense relationships 
in the context of the surrogate motherhood. The scenario, which is by no means 
far-fetched, of women being held captive and forced to produce children would 
be classified as a violation of human dignity8. Some argue that, in principle, 
surrogacy undermines the human dignity of the woman carrier, because her body 
and its reproductive function are brokered as a commodity9. The acquirement of 
an extensive hold over the body of the woman, considering the involvement of 
the whole body, the relationship between the pregnant woman and the embryo 
that develops during a pregnancy and the risks associated with pregnancy and 
giving birth, is highlighted10. Others reject a violation of human dignity to the 
6 Aside from being socially constructed ‘naturalness’ and ‘artificiality’, though, are comparative concepts: Things 
are more or less natural. Furthermore, the concept of natural can refer to the way something came into 
existence, its genesis, or to its quality and appearance. Both might diverge: an artificial genesis can lead to a 
result that is judged to be natural on the basis of its appearance. See D Birnbacher, Natürlichkeit (Berlin/New 
York: de Gruyter, 2006) 4 ff. But cf also for the far-reaching changes due to the ‘the artificial recreation of life in 
the laboratory’ C Delaunay, ‘The Beginning of Human Life at the Laboratory: The Challenges of a Technological 
Future for Human Reproduction’ (2015) 40 Technology in Society 14, 14 ff, 23.
7 See the estimate that more than 25000 children are thought to be born to Indian surrogates in P Shetty, 
‘India’s Unregulated Surrogacy Industry’ (2012) 380 The Lancet 1633, 1633. Cf also AH Elder, ‘Wombs to 
Rent: Examining the Jurisdiction of International Surrogacy’ (2014) 16 Oregon Review of International Law, 
347, 352 ff.
8 For this scenario see, eg, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Private international law issues 
surrounding the status of children, including issues arising from international surrogacy arrangements, 
Preliminary Document No. 11 of March 2011, Sect. 34, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publi- 
cations.details&pid=6175.
9 See, eg, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Motion for a resolution: Human Rights and ethical 
issues related to surrogacy, Doc 13562, 1.7.2014, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.
asp?file- id=21092&lang=en.
10 Secretariat of the Commission of the Bishop’s Conferences of the European Community (COMECE), Opinion of 
the Reflection Group on Bioethics on Gestational Surrogacy, 2015, 7 f.
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extent that willingness to act as a surrogate mother can be classified as based on 
a voluntary decision, for example when female family members or female friends 
volunteer11. If the autonomy of the surrogate mother is the focus of attention, 
considerations in connection with human dignity shift to the conditions that 
make free decisions possible or impossible and to the conditions of the surrogacy 
arrangement as a whole12. Poverty and commercialization are likely to create 
economic pressures13. Nevertheless, there is disagreement about whether such 
circumstances are sufficient to cause a violation of human dignity14. A further 
point of discussion is the selection of surrogate mothers on the basis of particular 
properties. Commercialization and specialized agencies might contribute to 
circumstances in which surrogates are chosen like goods for sale. As to the 
child, some emphasize that he or she might be seen as a commodity which 
has to feature particular properties and to fulfill particular expectations15. The 
scenario that a child might be ‘rejected’ has become reality in one case in which 
an Australian couple left a twin boy with Down syndrome (‘Baby Gammy’) with 
his Thai surrogate mother and only accepted the healthy baby girl. In addition, 
scenarios are conceivable in which children are ‘produced’ for the purpose 
of sexually abusing them, inflicting violence upon them or for forced labor. 
However, regarding babies as commodities or objects is in reality not the typical 
result of surrogacy and the implications depend not least on how surrogacy 
is regulated. Even this brief overview shows that the blanket assumption that 
human dignity is being violated by particular reproductive technologies is 
increasingly being superseded by arguments that can be differentiated in terms 
of content, reference point and level.
b. embryo And stem cell reseArch
Techniques used in assisted reproductive technology have resulted in a 
cascade of new fields of biotechnology. Embryonic and stem cell research in 
particular have sparked debate on biotechnology and human dignity of varying 
11 See, eg, T Hörnle, ‘Menschenwürde und Ersatzmutterschaft’ in JC Joerden, E Hilgendorf and F Thiele (eds), 
Menschenwürde und Medizin (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2013) 743, 748 f; P Jofer, Die Regulierung der 
Reproduktionsmedizin (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015) 310 ff.
12 See with different approaches CA Choudhury, ‘The Political Economy and Legal Regulation of Transnational 
Commercial Surrogate Labor’ (2015) 48 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1, 50 ff, 63 f; K Galloway, 
‘Theoretical Approaches to Human Dignity, Human Rights and Surrogacy’ in P Gerber and K O’Byrne (eds), 
Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights (Farnham/Burlington, Ashgate Publishing, 2015) 26 ff. For the difficulties of 
reaching an international regime see Y Ergas ‘Babies Without Borders: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and the 
Regulation of International Commercial Surrogacy’ (2013) 27 Emory International Law Review 117, 163 ff.
13 This is among the reasons why India aims at restricting the booming surrogacy industry, see The Surrogacy 
(Regulation) Bill, 2016, http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-surrogacy-regulation-bill-2016-4470/.
14 See Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings, Human trafficking for the purpose of the 
removal of organs and forced commercial surrogacy (The Hague, 2012) 17 ff; cf also CA Choudhury, ‘The 
Political Economy’ 4 ff.
15 Secretariat of the Commission, Opinion (n. 10), 13.
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intensity in different countries16. Assisted reproductive technology procedures 
inevitably result in surplus embryos. In addition, these procedures make it possible 
to fertilize egg cells in vitro and to allow them to develop into differentiated cell 
structures to a certain stage. In the initial stages the cells are totipotent, i.e., 
they can divide and develop into an entire individual provided the necessary 
conditions exist. This development potential that exists in principle, however, 
can in the meantime be suppressed from the outset using genetic engineering. 
Embryos in vitro also open up possibilities for harvesting embryonic stem cells, 
an area highly interesting to researchers17. Given the current state of research 
such a process results in the embryo being destroyed. Embryonic stem cells 
themselves are considered pluripotent; however, the extent of their potential 
for development has only been partly established and this potential can also 
be manipulated through artificial techniques. More recent research has derived 
stem cells not only from somatic cells (induced pluripotent stem cells) but also 
from parthenogenetic blastocysts (parthenogenetic stem cells)18 and aims at 
developing effective methods to revert specialized cells back to an embryonic 
stage (reprogramming)19.
In debate over this, the first complex of issues revolves around the question 
of whether embryos are protected by or, going even further, entitled to human 
dignity. As a consequence of the progress of natural sciences this question is 
increasingly being expanded to cover the – distinguishable but closely linked 
– question of the prerequisites for it to be possible to speak of an embryo 
at all, which, given the necessary additional conditions, can develop into a 
human being. Frequently, the view is expressed that human life and human 
dignity as its inherent worth begin at the time of the fusion of egg and sperm 
cell, through which its genetic uniqueness is established20. But this apparently 
‘natural’ position either insinuates numerous further presuppositions21 or is 
confronted with the problem that its scientific basis is increasingly being eroded, 
16 See, eg, T Farajkhoda, ‘An overview on ethical considerations in stem cell research in Iran and ethical 
recommendations: A review’ (2017), 15 International Journal of Reproductive BioMedicine 67, 68 ff; JA 
Robertson, ‘Embryo Stem Cell Research: Ten Years of Controversy’ (2010) 38 Journal of Law, Medicine & 
Ethics 191, 191 ff; FS Oduncu, ‘Stem Cell Research in Germany: Ethics of Healing vs. Human Dignity’ (2003) 
6 Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5, 5 ff.
17 More closely, also regarding the term ‘embryo’ Jofer, Regulierung (n. 11) 323 ff, 447 ff.
18 The question whether a non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been 
stimulated by parthenogenesis is ‘capable of commencing the process of development of a human being just 
as an embryo created by fertilisation of an ovum can do so’ was the subject matter of a decision of the ECJ, 
see Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (2014), accessible under curia.europa.eu.
19 See MZ Ratajczak, T Jadczyk, D Pędziwiatr and W Wojakowski, ‘New Advances in Stem Cell Research: 
Practical Implications for Regenerative Medicine’ (2014) 124 Polskie Archiwum Medycyny Wewnętrznej 418 
ff; D Cyranowski, ‘Stem Cells: The Black Box of Reprogramming’ (2014) 516 Nature 162 ff.
20 cf, eg, EW Böckenförde, ‘Menschenwürde als normatives Prinzip’ (2003) JuristenZeitung 809, 812.
21 Especially in the context of Christian ethics, see Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on 
respect for human life in its origin and on the dignity of procreation: replies to certain questions of the day 
(Donum Vitae) 1987.
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for example as a result of the possibility of cell reprogramming, the suppression 
of cell development potential, or cloning. In the highly controversial and 
widely conducted debate over convincing criteria several categories such as 
species membership, identity, continuity and potentiality are being discussed. 
The spectrum of development phases being used to define the point where the 
protection of human dignity begins extends from early cell stages to nidation all 
the way to birth. The possibilities and results of recent research require further 
differentiations which are even more difficult to specify. Some proposals for 
classifying totipotent human artefacts, for example, draw a distinction between 
transient totipotence and totipotent transience to underline the criterion 
whether cell entities are or are not embedded in a possibly fictitious context 
of procreation22. Regardless of the stance adopted, it is becoming apparent that 
recognition of human dignity is a decision which, although in no way arbitrary, 
must be given reasons for in compliance with criteria accepted as more or less 
convincing in different cultures and contexts.
The second complex is also controversial, to a certain degree: Provided 
that the protection of human dignity applies, what is to be regarded as a 
violation of human dignity? Some people closely connect the protection of 
dignity with the protection of human life. As a result, they view, for example, 
the destruction of human embryos for obtaining stem cells as a violation of 
human dignity. Usually, however, arguments related to human dignity are based 
on independent criteria. Regarding the harvesting of stem cells from embryos, 
it is less the destroying than it is their consumptive use for research purposes 
benefiting third parties that is the central point23. In part, a further differentiation 
is made here between on the one hand surplus embryos which would not 
proceed their development anyway under these circumstances, and on the other 
hand embryos which might have had the chance of being transferred into a 
womb, for example in the course of an embryo adoption. In addition, there 
is the conceivable constellation that embryos could be farmed specifically for 
consumptive embryo stem cell research. In the case of recognition of the right to 
protection of human dignity, in both of the latter two constellations a violation 
of human dignity is overwhelmingly recognized based on the argument that a 
human being is being treated like an object and instrumentalized for purposes 
benefiting third parties. Here the guiding principle derives from historical 
experiences with research on living human beings, which contributed to 
establishing the concept of human dignity.
22 J Kersten ‘Der rechtliche Status totipotenter menschlicher Artefakte – Transiente Totipotenz vs. totipotente 
Transienz’ in T Heinemann, HG Dederer and T Cantz (eds), Entwicklungsbiologische Totipotenz in Ethik und 
Recht (Göttingen, V&R unipress, 2014), 137, 147 ff.
23 See, eg, Oduncu, ‘Stem cell research’ (n. 16), 11, 14.
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c. reproductIve clonIng
In addition to embryo and stem cell research, reproductive cloning is 
a central topic in the human dignity debate. It is based on a future scenario, 
which, however, can be supported by reference to the already widely established 
cloning of animals. Meanwhile, techniques beyond cloning have entered the 
picture, e.g., the derivation of reproductively viable gametes via reprogramming 
(in vitro gametogenesis)24. These techniques raise their own problems as well as 
questions similar to those of cloning25.
In the case of human beings, even the necessary research prompts 
objections on the grounds of human dignity. This is all the more true because 
cloning research would be a matter of consumptive embryo stem cell research. 
Human dignity is being discussed in scenarios where cloning takes place without 
the cloned person’s consent. The requirement for consent is partly based on the 
use of body cells of the person, partly on the consequences the production 
and existence of a clone would have for the selfimage and the social position 
of the cloned person. From another perspective, discussion is focused on the 
human dignity of the clone. Some people reject human dignity as an argument 
because the clone only exists by virtue of cloning. However, the production of 
a clone as a potential violation of human dignity and the question of whether 
an existing clone can claim that a violation of human dignity is responsible 
for his or her existence are two separate questions. Some people regard the 
production of a clone as a violation of human dignity because they consider 
a person to be defined by his or her genetic uniqueness and a clone not to 
have the preconditions for or the possibility of a sufficient level of autonomy 
due to social expectations that the clone will resemble the cloned person26. 
Others point out that this perspective is based on genetic determinism which is 
incorrect and that it would be the inappropriate pressure or social expectations 
placed on the individual clone that challenge the clone’s human dignity27.
Usually uncontested violations of human dignity are, however, cloning 
scenarios such as clones bred as human beings that are deliberately stunted to 
do inferior works, clones bred to be enslaved or clones bred to serve as warriors 
24 See IG Cohen, GQ Daley and EY Adashi, ‘Disruptive reproductive technologies’ (2017), 9 (372) Science 
Translational Medicine 1 ff. (DOI:10.1126/scitranslmed.aag2959).
25 SM Suter, ‘In vitro gametogenesis: just another way to have a baby?’ (2016), 3
 Journal of Law and the Biosciences 87, 91 ff.
26 See, eg, C Kaveny, ‘Cloning and Positive Liberty’ (1999) 13 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 
15, 29 ff.
27 T Caulfield, ‘Human cloning laws, human dignity and the poverty of the policy making dialogue’ (2003) 4 
BMC Medical Ethics, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/4/3; RG Wright, ‘Second Thoughts: How 
Human Cloning Can Promote Human Dignity’ (2000) 35 Valparaiso University Law Review 1, 5 ff, 31 ff.
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or as an organ bank28. The discussions show that the idea of human dignity is 
becoming increasingly complex in its construction and is being more clear-
ly delineated. In addition, uncertainty and the assumptions people base their 
rationale on are playing a major role. In many cases it is assumptions about 
social or psychological consequences that are causing controversy, rather than 
normative judgments about violations of human dignity made on the basis of 
certain assumptions.
d. genetIc dIAgnostIcs
The work on the decoding of the human genome and the development of 
a series of technologies that have the capacity to generate vast quantities of DNA 
sequence data rapidly and at relatively low cost (next-generation sequencing) 
have advanced genetic diagnostics in an unprecedented manner. Above all in the 
US, questions of human dignity are being examined in the context of biobanks, 
which are classified as research ‘on’ human beings, although they are a matter 
of data referring to a person and of bodily materials separated from the body29. 
At times, human dignity is understood as the basis of self-determination, which 
is reflected in the requirement for ‘informed consent’30. In this respect, a link is 
made to the ‘concept of human dignity that is predominantly informed by post- 
-Holocaust humanrights deliberations’31. In part, reference is made to the argument 
that with the development of genetic diagnostics, extensive information about 
human beings is becoming possible in principle. Human dignity is intended to 
offer protection against people becoming (relatively) transparent to other people 
– others who with such knowledge would be in a position to block or influence 
their development prospects. Sometimes reference to human dignity is made to 
establish protection against fundamental discrimination32.
28 Wright, ‘Second Thoughts’ (n. 27), 18 f; T Hörnle, ‘Menschenwürde und reproduktives Klonen’ in JC Joerden, 
E Hilgendorf, F Thiele (eds), Menschenwürde und Medizin (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2013) 765, 770 
f; for imaginable scenarios and their probability see also A Bühl, Reproduktives Klonen in “real life” und in 
der Science Fiction‘ in A Bühl (ed), Auf dem Weg zur biomächtigen Gesellschaft? (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2009) 273, 298 ff, 306 ff.
29 Biobanks collect samples of bodily materials and medical or genetic data and information as well as general 
information about the health status or lifestyle of the person in question, in varying combinations, see M 
Albers, ‘Rechtsrahmen und Rechtsprobleme bei Biobanken’ (2013) 31 Medizinrecht 483, 483 f.
30 T Caulfield and R Brownsword, ‘Human dignity: a guide to policy making in the biotechnology era?’ (2006) 
7 Nature Review Genetics 72, 73: ‘[…] this is the most common application of human dignity – that is, as 
the foundation for specific legal entitlements, such as informed consent. It is the least contentious use of the 
concept of human dignity.’ More differentiating J Allen and B McNamara, ‘Reconsidering the Value of Consent 
in Biobank Research’ (2011) 25 Bioethics 155, 156 ff.
31 Caulfield and Brownsword, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 30), 72, with references to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration.
32 See, eg, CWL Ho and TSH Khan, ‘The Notion of Genetic Privacy’ in TSH Khan and CWL Ho (eds), Genetic 
Privacy: An Evaluation of the Ethical and Legal Landscape (London, Imperial College Press, 2013) 1, 1 ff.
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In the case of embryos in vitro, certain genetic characteristics or 
dispositions can be detected by means of genetic testing prior to implantation 
in the womb. Whether and to what extent such pre-implantation testing is 
permissible and the decision to implant may be made dependent upon its 
results is being vigorously discussed in some countries from the human dignity 
perspective. In these discussions the central issue is less the possible death of the 
embryo and more the act of selection33. From the point of view of the individual, 
it is argued that the embryo could be ‘discarded’ because of its genetic make-up 
and thus not treated as an ‘end in itself’. Looking at the matter more abstractly, 
objections related to human dignity are raised to the view that a life with certain 
genetic diseases should be avoided – because it devalues existing people who 
are living with such an illness, or because it promotes a view of human beings 
that does not adequately acknowledge imperfection as an element of human 
existence. The more extensive and refined the possibilities of pre-implantation 
diagnostics become, the less clearly defined the borders between selection 
and creation become even at this point in the process. ‘Designer babies’ is 
the popular catchword. Extensive selection decisions according to previously 
specified characteristics or dispositions – going beyond dispositions to illness 
to include for example, gender, hair and skin color, and intelligence – are 
being discussed in terms of human dignity. This involves, on the one hand, the 
individual person: using a distinction between born and made, some fear that 
fundamental impairments of identity, autonomy and recognition in the social 
community could be the outcome. On the other hand, human dignity is also 
taken into consideration in a more abstract way with a view to people who will 
live in the future or to humankind, which will be shaped by the technology- 
-assisted selection of people living today.
e. genetIc InterventIons
In addition to selection on the basis of information obtained through 
genetic diagnostics, genetic interventions are receiving increasing consideration. 
Like in other areas, technologies are developing quickly. Modern genome editing 
techniques, methods or tools allow for alterations of existing DNA sequences 
or insertion of new ones in a way that is considered to be surprisingly simple, 
controlled and cost-effective34. We can distinguish between interventions 
involving embryos, especially in case of assisted reproduction, and those 
33 See, eg, D Birnbacher, ‘Menschenwürde und Präimplantationsdiagnostik’ in JC Joerden, E Hilgendorf and F 
Thiele (eds), Menschenwürde und Medizin (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2013) 755, 760 ff.
34 cf, eg, JA Doudna and E Charpentier, ‘The new frontier of genome engineering with CRISPR-Cas9’ (2014) 346 
Science 6231, doi: 10.1126/science1258096; JD Sander and JK Joung, ‘CRISPR-Cas Systems for Editing, 
Regulating and Targeting Genomes’ (2014) 32 Nature Biotechnology 347 ff. For further developments see 
F Richter, I Fonfara, R Gelfert, J Nack, E Charpentier, A Möglich, ‘Switchable Cas9’ (2017), in: 48 Current 
opinion in biotechnology, 119 ff.
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involving born human beings who are or who may not be able to decide on their 
own. Furthermore, we can distinguish between interventions in germ cells and 
those in somatic cells. In the case of born human beings, genetic interventions 
via somatic gene therapy, gene transfer techniques or germline alterations are 
conceivable. Germline interventions affect all future generations. Transhumanist 
visions or science fiction narratives envisage the reshaping of humankind into a 
genetically modified post-human species.
Questions concerning violation of the dignity of individual people are 
being raised in connection with actions realized without their informed consent, 
even though they are in principle capable of making decisions. Clear cases are 
covert research on human beings or intervention by force in a person’s genetic 
characteristics. The spectrum is more controversial in the case of genetic 
interventions in people who by virtue of lack of capacity to make decisions, are 
not in any way, no longer or not yet able to decide for themselves35. Interventions 
in the germline focus attention on relatively unknown future generations who 
could be affected by unpredictable mechanisms36 or whose genes could be 
edited according to characteristics or dispositions chosen by others. Putting 
aside concerns about safety, however, despite germline alterations affect people 
not yet born, without their being able to agree to it, not every constellation raises 
problems in connection with human dignity. But constellations do exist where 
there is broad consensus on violations of human dignity. Scenarios include, for 
example, a situation where people are bred to take over various functions in a 
society featuring division of labor and people with brain functioning restricted 
by gene technology are used to carry out low-level work. Over and above the 
human dignity of individuals, some emphasize threats to humanity.
f. neurotechnologIes
Additional fields are attracting attention due to the convergence of 
biotechnology, neurotechnology and information technology: the possibilities 
of observing or intervening in the brain and the development of sophisticated 
human-machine interfaces37. Invasive or noninvasive techniques such as 
neuroimaging make it possible to examine brain structures and functions 
35 cf, eg, M Salvi, ‘Shaping Individuality: Human Inheritable Germ Line Gene Modification’ (2001) 22 Theoretical 
Medicine 527, 529 ff; WC Radau, Die Biomedizinkonvention des Europarates (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 
Springer, 2006) 341 ff.
36 cf E Lanphier, F Urnov, SE Haecker, M Werner and J Smolenski, ‘Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line’ (2015) 
519 Nature 410 f (emphasizing safety concerns).
37 For an overview see R Merkel, G Boer, J Fegert, T Galert, D Hartmann, B Nuttin and·S Rosahl, Intervening 
in the Brain. Changing Psyche and Society (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, Springer, 2007), 117 ff; RH Blank, 
Intervention in the Brain. Politics, Policy, and Ethics (Cambridge/London, MIT Press, 2013) 25 ff; M Albers, 
‘Grundrechtsschutz und Innovationserfordernisse angesichts neuartiger Einblicke und Eingriffe in das Gehirn’ 
in J Lindner (ed), Die neuronale Selbstbestimmung des Menschen (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2016) 63 ff.
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thoroughly and in real time and to analyze interrelationships with behavior.38 
Direct brain intervention methods include for example neurogenetic measures, 
deep brain stimulation, neural prostheses in various forms, or chips implanted in 
the brain. Neurogenetics involves supplementing or blocking neurotransmitters 
or replacing defective genes. Deep brain stimulation is less or more invasive 
in the form of electronic stimulation or implantation of electrodes that carry 
electrical signals to specific brain locations and cause the brain cells to change 
their activity. Brain implants record, stimulate or block impulses from neurons 
and could influence sensory or cognitive functions. Advanced research is aiming 
at creating interfaces between neural and computer systems or even brain-to- 
-brain interfaces39. Future scenarios envisage a symbiotic connection between 
the human biological system and various technical devices. The key word, 
although it is understood and used in a variety of different ways, is ‘cyborg’40.
Here too the fundamental question quickly arises of how human beings 
can be defined when the physical body is no longer the self-evident limit of a 
human being and criteria of internality and externality are subject to attacks41, 
and which human-machine entity is still a human being who has a right to 
human dignity. Similar questions from the opposite point of view are emerging in 
robotics and artificial intelligence42. Again, this discourse casts light on questions 
related to the constructivity of human dignity. At a concrete level, interventions 
in the human brain or man-machine entities raise the problem of what actually 
defines the core of a human being and what happens when brain functions can 
be controlled by external technology or by other people. Many methods have 
not been sufficiently investigated in detail and many questions are still open43. 
However, it is widely accepted that complete external neurotechnological 
control of brain function with the resulting loss of identity and autonomy of the 
38 Blank, Intervention in the Brain (n. 37) 49 ff.
39 Blank, Intervention in the Brain (n. 37) 38; K Choi and BK Min, ‘Future Directions for Brain-Machine 
Interfacing Technology’ in SW Lee, HH Bülthoff and KR Müller (eds), Recent Progress in Brain and Cognitive 
Engineering (Dordrecht, Springer, 2015) 3 ff; see also JB Trimper, PR Wolpe and KS Rommelfanger, ‘When 
“I” becomes “We”: ethical implications of emerging brainto-brain interfacing technologies’ (2014) 7 frontiers 
in Neuroengineering 2014, Article 4; E Hildt, ‘What will this do to me and my brain? Ethical issues in brain- 
-to-brain interfacing’ (2015) 9 frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 17.
40 Cybernetic organism; see R Kurzweil, Human Body Version 2.0 (2003), www.kurzweilai.net/human-body- 
-version-20; A Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 3; G Jones and M 
Whitaker, ‘Transforming the Human Body’ in C Blake, C Molloy and S Shakespeare (eds), Beyond Human. 
From Animality to Transhumanism (London/New York, Continuum, 2012) 254, 259 ff.
41 cf A Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs (n. 40), 3 ff.
42 See, eg, MC Gruber, ‘Was spricht gegen Maschinenrechte?’ in MC Gruber, J Bung and S Ziemann (eds), 
Autonome Automaten. Künstliche Körper und artifizielle Agenten in der technisierten Gesellschaft (Berlin, 
trafo, 2014) 191, 199 ff. Artificial intelligence and artificial life have become mature interdisciplines and thus 
demonstrate their complexity and possible significance for future generations, for an overview see W Banzhaf 
and B McMullin, ‘Artificial Life’ in G Rozenberg, T Bäck and JN Kok (eds), Handbook of Natural Computing 
(Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer, 2012) 1805, 1806 ff.
43 cf B Schmitz-Luhn, C Katzenmeier and C Woopen, ‘Law and Ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation’ (2012) 35 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 130, 130 ff.
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individual is incompatible with human dignity. ‘Brainwashing’ or destruction 
through deprivation are the historical parallels that have become known from 
wartime experiences.
g. ‘pAtents on lIfe’
Last but not least, biotechnologies and biotechnical inventions entail 
questions of patents. A patent gives its holder exclusive rights to the use of the 
patented invention for a specified time. On one hand, a patent can be granted 
as a product patent for an invented product or – in the narrower case of a 
new substance – as a substance patent. As a rule, the patented product is then 
protected absolutely, i.e., with regard to all known or still unknown functions 
and uses, regardless of whether the patent holder has specified them or even 
acknowledged their existence. On the other hand, patent holders can obtain 
a patent for a process they have invented, a patent also granting fundamental 
and absolute protection in connection with all applications and purposes 
with regard to that process. The protection provided by a process patent also 
extends to products resulting directly from applications. For the manufacture 
of a patented product or the application of a patented process third parties are 
required to obtain a license from the patent holder. Being purely an exclusive 
right, a patent does not grant permission to carry out the invention. But it would 
not make sense if it were already clear that this embodiment must be prohibited 
with lasting effect, for instance because it violates human dignity. Apart from 
this, an exclusive right can also be contrary to normative standards. Patent law 
and patent protection are by no means ethically neutral.
‘Patents on life’ is a catchphrase which has resulted in fierce discussions 
in which human dignity is a key point44. Today, the central distinction in patent 
law is no longer, as was the case in the past, the difference between living 
organisms and lifeless material, but the distinction – no longer based on this 
difference – between discoveries on the one hand and human inventions on the 
other45. In connection with this, substances that are found in nature but isolated 
and extracted from their natural environment and thus made readily available 
are, in principle, just as capable of being patented as are organisms manufactured 
by means of bioengineering or genetic engineering. Against this background, 
patent applications have claimed or claim patents for procedures or products 
44 See more thoroughly M Albers, ‘Patente auf Leben’ (2003) JuristenZeitung 275, 275 ff; C Meiser, 
Biopatentierung und Menschenwürde (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006) 15 ff.
45 See the landmark decision Diamond v Chakrabarty, decided 1980 by the US Supreme Court, 447 U.S. 303. 
See also US Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in re Bergy, Chakrabarty, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979) 
975: ‘In fact, we see no legally significant difference between active chemicals which are classified as “dead” 
and organisms used for their chemical reactions which take place because they are “alive”. Life is largely 
chemistry.’
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involving human DNA sequences, cells, organs or tissue as well as chimeras, 
embryonic stem cells or embryos themselves. In this discourse, human dignity 
remains to some extent a vague standard against commodification of humans46 
creeping in by patenting human material47. However, the idea of granting a 
product patent on an embryo is, to the extent that the embryo can develop 
into a human being, a very clear example where human dignity sets limits for a 
systematically thought out logic of patent law.
h. conclusIon
In discussions of biotechnologies, human dignity sometimes seems 
merely to articulate ‘a general social unease with a given technology’48. 
Nevertheless, understanding of human dignity is neither entirely indeterminate 
nor completely heterogeneous, nor is every aspect of it disputed. On the 
contrary, there is broad and widespread consensus about certain issues.49 It 
would be incompatible with human dignity to enslave women for the purpose 
of forced surrogate motherhood. Children must never be treated as goods which 
are produced and required to have certain properties and which need not be 
accepted in the event of flaws. Once human life enjoys the protection of human 
dignity, consumptive use for research purposes benefiting third parties becomes 
a violation of human dignity. Secret gene analyses aimed at ascertaining the 
full genetic characteristics and dispositions of a particular person and linking 
these to discriminatory consequences or selling the results of such analysis to 
interested parties constitute violations of human dignity. An intervention in the 
brain of a person which leads to the thinking and behavior of this person being 
externally controlled by others is also a violation of human dignity. A human 
being cannot be the basis for a product patent.
There is also disagreement on many matters, however. In part, problems 
regarding knowledge and uncertainties form the basis of the controversy. 
Because the human is now subject to transformation and transgression in an 
unprecedented manner, we often do not know what consequences are to be 
expected. Numerous predictions are highly controversial, for example, whether 
cloned or genetically altered persons would no longer be able to see themselves 
as autonomous persons or as the authors of their own biographical histories, 
46 As to the (non-)commodification with a view to organ markets cf also I Schneider, ‘The Body, the Law, and the 
Market: Public Policy Implications in a Liberal State’ in M Albers, T Hoffmann and J Reinhardt (eds), Human 
Rights and Human Nature (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, Springer, 2014) 197, 197 ff.
47 See (with criticism and an own approach) DB Resnik, ‘DNA Patents and Human Dignity’ (2001) 29 Journal 
of Law, Medicine & Ethics 152, 152 ff.
48 Caulfield and Brownsword, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 30), 72.
49 The point of reference here is current global society. Nothing changes with regard to the existing consensus 
due to the fact that there are always people and groups who dispute statements or evaluations.
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or whether social relationships would change if human beings were cloned or 
genetic engineering conducted intentionally on embryos. Differing underlying 
assumptions and predictions may explain divergent assessments.
In part, appraisals and value judgments are at the heart of the controversies. 
When is a living creature a ‘human being’? At what point do measures that restrict 
autonomy reach the point where they violate human dignity? What worth does 
the human body have and to what extent may body parts or bodily functions be 
commercialized? And what is the ‘human body’? From an analytical perspective, 
knowledge and value judgments are separate issues, and breaking them down 
into their components is helpful. In complex biotechnological fields, however, 
this comes up against the problem that knowledge is no longer broadly shared 
and fundamental uncertainties are dealt with using values as guidelines50. That 
is among the reasons why discourse about human dignity is partly vague and 
heterogeneous. It can incidentally also be shown that the point of reference 
underlying considerations of consequences and evaluations varies. The point 
of reference is not the individual only. It is also the others who are affected to 
the same degree and have the same right to be considered; it is future human 
beings or an even more highly abstracted humanity as such. Human dignity is 
also being referred to in more abstract lines of argument involving the potential 
of a technology to change the framework of mutual human interactions in such 
a way that violations of human dignity are made possible and are increasingly 
actually occurring. In turn, what is convincing as the point of reference in a given 
constellation is disputed. But even where there are disagreements, it is not that 
human dignity offers no help in clarifying matters. On the contrary, the sorting 
out of the issues in each complex which is among the effects of the discussions 
contributes as much to understanding those issues as to understanding human 
dignity. Since the discussions of biotechnologies become more differentiated 
judgments using human dignity ‘as a form of general condemnation’51 are 
increasingly being replaced by more nuanced approaches. Human dignity is 
understood as a requirement calling for regulation, which does not ban the use 
of biotechnologies entirely but shapes it in such a way that imaginable violations 
of human dignity are avoided.
Discussions are being carried on in many contexts: throughout society, 
in the political system, and in various scientific disciplines. However, the theme 
of human dignity having legal status is, in a form specific to the given context, 
often implied. Especially in the area of biotechnology, the attractiveness of 
50 See M Albers, ‘Enhancement, Human Nature, and Human Rights’, in M Albers, T Hoffmann and J Reinhardt 
(eds), Human Rights and Human Nature (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York, Springer, 2014) 235, 
258 ff.
51 Caulfield and Brownsword, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 30), 72.
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human dignity as an argument is supported by the fact that its considerable legal 
value is generally known.
II – LEGAL CONTExTS
The legal contexts, with their own independent characteristics, will now 
become the central focus of the further analysis. Texts establishing norms can 
serve as crystallization points, although the law is not defined by texts alone and 
codified norms play differing roles in different legal systems. Human dignity is 
enshrined in a series of legal documents, for example in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, in national constitutions, in the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights or in specific conventions in the field of biomedicine (A.). 
The picture becomes more complex, because there are several communication 
contexts within the legal system that operate relatively independently. These 
include in particular legislation (B.), jurisdiction (C.) and jurisprudence (D.).
A. estAblIshment of humAn dIgnIty In cAtAlogues of humAn rIghts
The now quite widespread establishment of human dignity in legal texts 
and documents is a recent achievement, primarily a ‘postwar constitutional 
conception’52 due to the horrendous experiences of the Second World War. 
The Charter of the United Nations, which was ratified and entered into force on 
October 24, 1945, declares in its Preamble that, after the scourge of war, the 
peoples of the United Nations are determined ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person […]’. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which was proclaimed by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948, enshrines dignity both in its Preamble and in Article 1:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.
The text is relatively vague both in its contents and in its legal consequences. 
In addition, there is disagreement concerning the extent to which the Universal 
Declaration as such has legally binding effects. Some regard it as ius cogens, 
others acknowledge the binding nature in customary international law of at least 
some of its rights, while still others confine its effects to that of a simple appeal 
and guideline. Both factors lead to a situation where in this context human 
dignity can be understood as on the one hand a fundamental, on the other hand 
a relatively open concept.
52 See LE Weinrib, ‘Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism’ in VC Jackson and MV Tushnet 
(eds), Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law (Westport, Praeger, 2002) 23 ff.
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It is certain that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its 
enshrinement of dignity have inspired further international declarations in various 
fields53, particularly in bioethics and biotechnologies, as well as bills of rights 
in constitutional documents of national states. At the international level, human 
dignity is emphasized in the Convention of the United Nations on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. The United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning 
states that Member States are called upon to prohibit all forms of human cloning 
inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity and to adopt measures 
necessary to prohibit the application of genetic engineering techniques that may 
be contrary to human dignity54. Obviously, the text requires interpretation55, 
and the legal consequences are those of soft law. As a specialized agency of the 
UN, UNESCO has adopted three influential declarations on bioethical topics: 
The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), 
the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) and the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). Each of their Preambles 
refers to human dignity, which is declared to be one of the main bioethical 
principles56. All declarations include general provisions for human dignity to be 
fully respected and provisions stressing the fundamental equality of all human 
beings in dignity and rights as well as nondiscrimination and non-stigmatization 
of individuals or groups. Beyond that, the Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights makes use of human dignity in further respects: The 
human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human 
family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity, and is, 
in a symbolic sense, the heritage of humanity57. Everyone has a right to respect 
for their dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic characteristics. 
That dignity makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic 
characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and diversity58. No one shall be 
subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended 
to infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms 
or human dignity59. Practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as 
53 cf K Dicke ‘The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ in D 
Kretzmer and E Klein (eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 2002) 111, 111 ff.
54 UN Resolution A/RES/59/280, adopted 2005.
55 See Caulfield and Brownsword, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 30), 75: at least three interpretive opportunities to narrow 
the scope of the cloning prohibition (by taking ‘inasmuch as’ to mean ‘to the extent that’ rather than ‘for the 
reason that’; by adopting the empowerment rather than the constraint conception of human dignity; and by 
reading human life through a human-rights lens).
56 cf with view to human dignity as a principle of international bioethics R Andorno, ‘First Steps in the 
Development of an International Biolaw’ in C Gastmans, K Dierick, H Nys and P Schotmans (eds), New 
Pathways for European Bioethics (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2007) 121, 125 ff.
57 Art. 1 of the UDHGHR.
58 Art. 2 of the UDHGHR, see also Art. 6 of the UDHGHR.
59 Art. 6 of the UDHGHR; see also Art. 7 of the IDHGD emphasizing nondiscrimination and non-stigmatization 
of individuals, families, groups and communities.
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reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted60. Benefits from 
advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome, 
shall be made available to all, with due regard for the dignity and human rights of 
each individual61. A review of these provisions reveals the multifaceted meanings 
and dimensions of protection in connection with which dignity is discussed and 
how greatly in need of interpretation it is. Dignity is mostly mentioned in the 
context of human rights. However, this does not mean that one can simply 
conclude that it is fundamentally different from a right, for instance merely a 
guiding principle. All three declarations are of a declaratory nature. This soft law 
character was explicitly chosen with a view to the constantly changing context, 
the broadest possible consensus to be reached among signatory countries, and 
the regulation-promoting effects of awareness raising and public debate62.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) contains no express reference to dignity. 
Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights invokes human dignity as 
the basis of the Convention and its rights63. The later Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine mentions human dignity in its preamble and purpose; 
the following articles develop more elaborated provisions in a variety of 
contexts. The preambles and purposes of its Additional Protocols refer to human 
dignity with regard to the prohibition of any intervention seeking to create a 
human being genetically identical to another human being64, with regard to the 
prohibition of all forms of discrimination, in particular those based on genetic 
characteristics65, and with regard to research involving interventions on human 
beings66. Unlike the UN or UNESCO declarations, the standards are binding. 
However, because of the institutional conditions of a framework convention 
they specify only minimum standards below which States having ratified must 
not fall67.
60 Art. 11 of the UDHGHR.
61 Art. 12 of the UDHGHR.
62 For the functions of soft law see F Molnár-Gábor, ‘Die Herausforderung der medizinischen Entwicklung für das 
internationale soft law am Beispiel der Totalsequenzierung des menschlichen Genoms’ (2012) 72 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 695, 705 ff.
63 See, eg, ECtHR, Goodwin v UK, Appl. No. 28957/95, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 2002-IV, 31 f: 
‘[…] the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom.’
64 Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, CETS 168.
65 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Genetic Testing for 
Health Purposes, CETS 203.
66 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research, 
CETS 195.
67 For a closer analysis see M Albers, ‘Die rechtlichen Standards der BiomedizinKonvention des Europarats’ 
(2002) Europarecht 801, 801 ff.
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The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union gives human 
dignity explicitly highest priority. The title of the first chapter is ‘Dignity’. Art. 1 of 
the EU Charter states that human dignity is inviolable and must be respected 
and protected68. The first chapter further includes the right to life, the right to 
the integrity of the person, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment and the prohibition of slavery and forced labor69. The 
right to the integrity of the person, anchored in Art. 3 of the EU Charter, includes 
rights in the fields of medicine and biology. In particular, the free and informed 
consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures laid down by 
law, the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the 
selection of persons, the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as 
such a source of financial gain and the prohibition of the reproductive cloning 
of human beings must be respected. The fundamental rights of the Charter are 
binding for all institutions and bodies of the European Union, for the Member 
States only when they are implementing Union law70. Because the law of the 
European Union is expanding and the European Court of Justice interprets the 
term ‘implementing Union law’ broadly, the fundamental rights of the European 
Union are becoming increasingly important. As far as they are applicable, they 
are superseding the fundamental rights of the constitutions of Member States.
In many Nation States’ constitutions, human dignity is incorporated as 
a significant norm in a central position71. The most prominent and influential 
example is the German Basic Law, adopted after the Second World War in 
1949. Article 1 para. 1 of the German Basic Law establishes the inviolability or, 
in other words, the indefeasibility (‘Unantastbarkeit’)72 of human dignity and the 
duty of all public authority to respect and to protect it. Hence, no reservation 
is added permitting limitation by or in terms of legislation. The provision is 
also safeguarded from constitutional amendment73. Although the high rank and 
68 The enshrinement and the wording have been influenced by Art. 1 para 1 of the German Basic Law. The 
meaning of human dignity and its inviolability must and will be interpreted, though, in the context of the EU 
legal order, cf C Dupré, ‘Article 1 – Human Dignity’ in S Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (BadenBaden/Munich/Oxford, Nomos/C.H. Beck/Hart Publishing, 2014) 
01.18 ff, 01.39 ff.
69 See Dupré, ‘Article 1’ 01.05 (n. 68): ‘Article 1 EUCFR is clearly related to all the rights enshrined under Title 
I “Dignity” […].’
70 Art. 51 para 1 EU Charter.
71 See the overviews in A Barak, Human Dignity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015) 49 ff; in 
C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights‘ (2008) 19 The European 
Journal of International Law 655, 664 ff; in H Botha, ‘Human Dignity in Comparative Perspective’ (2009) 
2 Stellenbosch Law Review 171, 175 ff; and in D Shulztiner and G Carmi, ‘Human Dignity in National 
Constitutions: Functions, Promises and Dangers‘ (2014) 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 461 ff.
72 cf D Grimm, ‘Dignity in a Legal Context: Dignity as an Absolute Right’ in C McCrudden (ed), Understanding 
Human Dignity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 381, 387.
73 cf Art. 79 para 3 of the German Basic Law. For a comprehensive analysis of the legal background and legal 
aspects of Art. 1 para 1 of the German Basic Law see M Hong, Der Menschenwürdegehalt der Grundrechte 
(Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2017).
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the binding character of Article 1 para. 1 of the German Basic Law have been 
made explicit, many aspects are open to interpretation. This does not apply 
only to the relatively vague contents. The legal nature and dimensions of the 
provision have to be developed as well: Is the guarantee of human dignity 
a founding value or principle, an objective norm serving as a guide to the 
interpretation of ordinary law, the basis of other human rights or a guideline 
to their interpretation, an individual right enforceable in the same way as any 
other right, a ‘right to have rights’ or a right protecting particular legal goods? 
Is it plausible to understand it, as the Federal Constitutional Court does, as a 
combination of several dimensions? Looking at other Constitutions, human 
dignity can be found in the preamble or in the provisions. The wordings range 
from a fundamental principle or value, often referred to in conjunction with 
other values such as freedom, equality, solidarity and social security74, to an 
individual right that is enforceable before the courts. Interpretation may lead 
to interdependencies and multi-layered architectures, e.g., if the fundamental 
principle is understood as a source enabling interpreters to derive rights or 
if human dignity is understood as a ‘motherright’75. Sometimes, multilayered 
dimensions are already laid down in the document. The Constitution of South 
Africa, for instance, acknowledges human dignity as a constitutional right, a 
supreme value and a guide to constitutional interpretation76.
In national constitutions, there is seldom any direct mention of modern 
biotechnological developments. The Swiss Federal Constitution is an exception. 
Art. 119, adopted by a popular vote in 2015, states that the confederation 
shall legislate on the use of human reproductive and genetic material and in 
so doing ensure the protection of human dignity, privacy and the family and 
adhere to a number of principles. These include making any forms of cloning 
and interference with the genetic material of human reproductive cells and 
embryos illegal, forbidding inserting nonhuman reproductive and genetic 
material into human reproductive material, banning embryo donations and all 
forms of surrogate motherhood and safeguarding that a person’s genetic material 
may only be analyzed, registered or made public under certain circumstances. 
To what extent and how exactly the idea of human dignity substantiates these 
provisions, however, is a matter of interpretation.
As a result, interdependencies among documents and wordings can be 
observed, as well as similarities or significant differences in the ways in which 
human dignity is incorporated as an element of positive law. Closer analysis 
74 cf Botha (n. 71), ‘Human dignity’ 176, 196 ff.
75 cf A Barak, ‘Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right’ in C McCrudden (ed), 
Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 361, 373 ff; A L Bendor and M Sachs, 
‘The Constitutional Status of Human Dignity in Germany and Israel’ (2011) 44 Israel Law Review 25, 44 ff.
76 In more detail Botha, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 71), 175 ff.
DPU Nº 82 – Jul-Ago/2018 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL – DOUTRINA .............................................................................................................29 
RDU, Porto Alegre, Volume 15, n. 82, 2018, 9-49, jul-ago 2018
uncovers the multitude of functions the reliance on human dignity serves. This 
is true in general terms, but also to the extent that provisions concern themselves 
specifically with modern biotechnologies77. Apart from this already complex 
picture, law goes beyond what is stipulated in texts. Instead, texts are consulted 
and referred to and applied in varying contexts.
b. dIgnIty In legIslAtIve processes And lAws
To analyze the role of human dignity in lawmaking a rough distinction 
can be made between the processes of lawmaking and the laws resulting from 
lawmaking. At least in democratic transnational or national societies contractual 
or constitutional rules of procedure define lawmaking processes in such a way 
that they are open to a greater or lesser extent to the impact of public debate. 
The forms this takes include participatory forums or platforms, many different 
forms of communication with members of parliament, coverage in the media 
and, especially in the fields of modern biotechnologies, participatory procedures 
initiated by ethics committees. Arguments based on human dignity often come 
into play here because they are firmly anchored in the public mind. From 
religious to atheist, from sophisticated to simplifying lines of argument, the range 
of views in society has a legally recognized place both in the above-mentioned 
contexts and in parliamentary debates. Beyond that, relevant transnational 
norms such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine – to 
the extent that they have been ratified – exert legal influence on the lawmaking 
process as binding or soft law that impacts national law. Relevant rulings of 
transnational courts can be effective as well, although in strictly procedural 
terms the impacts of rulings are regularly limited to the case in question. Insofar 
as human dignity is established in the constitution as a principle or as a right, 
the resulting binding effects have to be taken into account in lawmaking. The 
vagueness and complexity of the idea of dignity result in varied interpretations. 
Whether this devalues its role or even gives it greater value is a question of the 
theoretical framework and perspective from which analyses and assessments 
are made. At least in recent decades, human dignity has played a major role in 
lawmaking processes involving regulation of modern biotechnologies.
Laws, as results of lawmaking, deal with the problems modern 
biotechnologies have raised within the context of the relevant specialized 
laws. These are quite different laws regarding the legal issues to be regulated, 
their legal classification and the contents. The concrete legal provisions are 
embedded in the specialized legal architecture and terminology of civil or 
criminal law, of medical or health law, of patent law or laws specific to various 
77 See also M Albers, ‘Bioethik, Biopolitik, Biorecht: Grundlagen und Schlüsselprobleme’ in id (ed), Bioethik, 
Biorecht, Biopolitik: Eine Kontextualisierung (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2016) 9, 28.
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other domains. The concept of human dignity is rarely mentioned here; if at all, 
in preambles or statements of purposes. Nonetheless, particular legal provisions 
can be influenced by the criterion of human dignity without this concept being 
mentioned in the text of the law. This applies all the more in view of the fact that 
the guarantee of human dignity by no means necessarily leads to simple ‘Yes/
No’ decisions. Laws can, of course, specify prohibitions or exception clauses 
in the context of their area of application. Examples include the prohibition 
of reproductive cloning in the laws of numerous countries, the prohibition of 
surrogacy in Switzerland78, the frequent prohibition of creating embryos for 
research purposes79, the in-principle prohibition of stem cell importation in 
Germany80 or the exemption of processes for modifying the germ line genetic 
identity of human beings or uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes from being patented81. However, prohibitions are not the only 
imaginable outcome. Frequently, the influence of human dignity is reflected in 
the fact that a law specifies conditions which are intended to prevent violations 
of human dignity from taking place. In a number of States, conditions have 
been laid down for surrogate motherhood as well as for other aspects of assisted 
reproduction82. Preimplantation and genetic diagnosis is often possible under 
specific conditions, but not without restriction or arbitrarily. For genetic and 
neurotechnological interventions, legal provisions have been enacted to some 
extent or are to be enacted on the basis of which particular measures are to be 
possible while maintaining respect for human dignity. Admittedly, appropriate 
regulation is lacking frequently enough. Human dignity then expressly prompts 
emphatic calls for regulation in public discourse.
Regardless of whether and to what extent guarantees of human dignity 
have had an effect, the law provides an independent text that is relatively 
autonomous from how it came into existence and develops its own binding 
nature. For the understanding and, not infrequently, acceptance of legal 
78 Art. 119 para 2d of the Swiss Constitution, Art. 4 SwissFMedG (Bundesgesetz über die medizinisch 
unterstützte Fortpflanzung; Federal Act on Assisted Reproduction). The Explanatory Statement of the 
Bundesrat states that surrogacy is seen as a instrumentalization of the surrogate mother, see Botschaft über 
die Volksinitiative ‘zum Schutz des Menschen vor Manipulationen in der Fortpflanzungstechnologie (Initiative 
für menschenwürdige Fortpflanzung, FMF)’ und zu einem Bundesgesetz über die medizinisch unterstützte 
Fortpflanzung (Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz, FMedG), BBl 1996 III 205, 230, 254 (see also http://www.
amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.do?id=10053942).
79 See, eg, for France Art. L. 2151-2 du code de la santé publique; cf also I Kriari-Catranis, ‘Embryo Research 
and Human Rights – An Overview of Developments in Europe’ (1997) 4 European Journal of Health Law 43, 
55f.
80 cf § 1 StZG (Stammzellgesetz; Stem Cell Act) mentioning human dignity among the purposes.
81 Art. 6 Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions; cf also recital 38. For a recent 
survey on the international regulatory landscape regarding human germline gene modification see M Araki 
and T Ishii, ‘International Regulatory Landscape and Integration of Corrective Genome Editing into In Vitro 
Fertilization’ (2014) Reproductive Biology and Endocrinology 12:108, 8 ff.
82 For an overview cf the articles in K Trimmings and P Beaumont (eds.), International Surrogacy Arrangements: 
Legal Regulation at the International Level (Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing, 2013).
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provisions it is often a matter of importance that these provisions are based not 
merely on issues of human dignity, but also on other grounds83.
In this way, interpretation of the laws can to a certain extent be kept 
separate from disagreements related to human dignity. This plays a role 
especially for courts that are required to apply the laws in specific cases.
c. dIgnIty In the reAsonIng of courts
When investigating the role of human dignity in the context of court 
rulings84 characteristics of and structural limitations to court proceedings and 
decisions must be kept in mind85. Courts are responsible for making binding 
decisions on cases brought before them as impartial bodies and on the basis of 
the law. Depending on the particular procedure – civil law dispute, criminal trial, 
judicial review, a human rights or constitutional complaint, preliminary ruling – 
procedural rules specify more or less broadly who can bring a complaint before 
the court and what the matter to be examined is, what additional jurisdictional 
requirements exist, what standard of proof is to be applied, that reasons must be 
given for decisions to a particular extent, and what legal consequences decisions 
have. Among the requirements is, first of all, a plaintiff being able to bring a case 
before the court and actually doing so. The ruling relates to the particular facts 
of the case and to the particular object of judicial review. For this reason, the 
ruling must always be interpreted in terms of the particular constellation or case 
and the claims brought before the court. The relevant normative measures have 
to be worked out in the course of the proceedings. The way the guarantee of 
human dignity comes into play as a normative standard depends on the type of 
proceedings. Administrative, criminal or civil courts have to interpret statutory 
laws but when doing so, they must take the binding effects of transnational 
or constitutional norms as well as those of legally binding rulings of higher 
courts into account86. Hence, the guarantee of human dignity as it applies in 
law is relevant within a context which is always also shaped by legal norms and 
legislative decisions. In human rights or constitutional proceedings before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or constitutional courts, on the other 
83 As an example with a view to Germany: § 1 para 1 no. 7 ESchG (Embryo Protection Act [1990], for a 
translation see http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/
EmbryoProtection Act.pdf) penalizing a person who carries out artificial fertilization in cases of women who 
are prepared to permanently hand over the child after its birth to a third party or implants an embryo under 
these circumstances, for instance, is not based on human dignity but on predicted negative consequences for 
the child and the surrogate and potential conflicts between the intended mother and the surrogate, see the 
Explanatory Statement, BTDrucks. 11/5460, 6 ff, dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/11/054/1105460.pdf.
84 See, in general, McCrudden ‘Human Dignity’ (n. 71), 682 ff.
85 See more closely M Albers, ‘Höchstrichterliche Rechtsfindung und Auslegung gerichtlicher Entscheidungen’ 
in 71 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (VVDStRL), Grundsatzfragen der 
Rechtsetzung und Rechtsfindung (Berlin and Boston, de Gruyter, 2012) 257, 259 ff.
86 Albers, ‘Rechtsfindung’ (n. 85), 265, 267 f.
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hand, the guarantee of human dignity can be a standard applying directly to the 
questions of the case. In the relationship between these courts and legislation, 
however, the scope of the courts’ judicial powers is to a greater or lesser 
extent limited, whether because of the recognition of signatory states’ margin 
of appreciation or because of institutional factors and distribution of powers. 
Specifically in the case of the guarantee of human dignity, this quite often has an 
impact in the form of judicial restraint. The way courts reach their legal findings 
is also determined by legal systems and judicial cultures87.
Meanwhile, assisted reproduction and its consequences have been the 
frequent subject of court rulings. In some rulings human dignity has been applied 
as a standard. In the landmark case of Evans v. The United Kingdom, which was 
decided by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in 200788, the applicant and her 
former boyfriend had undertaken an IVF treatment before the applicants’ ovaries 
had been removed and six fertilized eggs consigned to storage. A few months later 
the man withdrew his consent. The applicant commenced proceedings seeking 
an injunction requiring the man to restore his consent to the use and storage 
of the embryos and a declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 to the effect that the domestic law allowing consent to be withdrawn 
at any stage as long as the embryo created has not been used for treatment 
breached her rights and neglected the protection embryos were entitled to. The 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR considered a wide margin of appreciation of the 
member States in this field and held that the interests pursued by the legislation 
are legitimate and consistent with Article 8 ECHR:
Respect for human dignity and free will […] underlay the legislature’s 
decision to enact provisions permitting of no exception to ensure that every 
person donating gametes for the purpose of IVF treatment would know in 
advance that no use could be made of his or her genetic material without his or 
her continuing consent89.
Contracting States also enjoy a margin of appreciation with regard to the 
issue of when the right to life begins as a result of the absence of any European 
consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life. Because 
an embryo does not have independent rights or interests under English law, the 
Court concluded that the right to life, Article 2 ECHR, was not violated.
Provisions of the Austrian Artificial Procreation Act prohibiting the use 
of ova from donors and, under further circumstances, of sperm from donors 
87 cf for the ECtHR NL Arold, The Legal Culture of the European Court of Human Rights (Leiden/Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) especially 67 ff.
88 Evans v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 6339/05 (2007), hudoc.echr.coe.int.
89 Evans v. The United Kingdom, para 89.
DPU Nº 82 – Jul-Ago/2018 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL – DOUTRINA .............................................................................................................33 
RDU, Porto Alegre, Volume 15, n. 82, 2018, 9-49, jul-ago 2018
for in-vitro fertilization were the subject matter of the case S. H. and others v. 
Austria.90 In the course of the procedure a Chamber of the First Section of the 
ECtHR held that the prohibitions violated rights under Art. 14 in conjunction 
with Art. 8 of the Convention. It found, inter alia, that concerns based on moral 
considerations or on social acceptability were not in themselves sufficient 
reasons for a complete ban on a specific artificial procreation technique, that 
the legal framework regulating this field must be shaped in a coherent manner 
and that risks, such as the risk of the exploitation of women or the selection of 
children, could be addressed by sufficient legal safeguards. In its subsequent 
ruling handed down in 2011, the Grand Chamber came to the opposite result 
by stressing that the questions touch on sensitive moral and ethical issues where 
there is not yet clear common ground among the member States and that the 
Austrian legislature did not exceed the wide margin of appreciation. It noted that 
there is no prohibition under Austrian law on going abroad to seek treatment 
of infertility that uses assisted reproductive technology not allowed in Austria, 
and that in the event of a successful treatment the Civil Code rules on paternity 
and maternity would be applicable. The deliberations do not refer to human 
dignity. Only the opinion of Judge de Gaetano stated separately, though quite 
vaguely, that the recognition of the value and dignity of every person may 
require the prohibition of certain acts in order to uphold the inalienable value 
and intrinsic dignity of every human being. The joint dissenting opinion of four 
judges criticized the broad margin of appreciation afforded and questioned the 
persuasiveness of the argument that there is no prohibition on going abroad.
Precisely the problems of cross-border use of assisted reproductive 
technologies are increasingly the subject of court rulings on surrogacy. In this 
respect the courts are dealing with issues arising from the use of surrogates in a 
foreign country, particularly with the legal status of the child. In the early stages, 
the famous court rulings in the US91 and India92 pointed to the not sufficiently 
regulated broad range of ethical and legal problems; especially the Indian Courts 
90 S. H. and others v Austria, Appl. No. 57813/00 (2011), hudoc.echr.coe.int.
91 Baby M, decided 1988 by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227, law.justia.
com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/1988/109-n-j-3961.html; Johnson v. Calvert, decided 1993 by 
the Californian Supreme Court, 5 Cal4th 84, 851 P.2d 776 (1993), law.justia.com/cases/california/
supremecourt/4th/5/84.html; cf meanwhile Sec. 7960-7962 California Family Code.
92 In the Baby Manji case the legal status of the child created from the sperm of the Japanese father and an egg 
harvested from an anonymous Indian woman and born to a surrogate mother was unclear after the Japanese 
couple got divorced and, in contrast to the father, the woman didn’t want the child any more because she 
felt no genetical, biological, moral or legal obligation to the child. The Indian Supreme Court tried to solve 
the case which was settled by issuing Baby Manji a travel permission and directed the Indian legislature to 
enact legal rules governing surrogacy, Baby Manji Yamada v Union of India & ANR (2008) INSC 1656, http://
indiankanoon.org/doc/854968/. In the landmark Balaz Twins-Decision the Gujarat High Court dealt with the 
legal status of twins created by using the father’s sperm and an anonymous ova donation and given birth by a 
gestational surrogate; the Court mentioned ethical issues in detail, inter alia the right to privacy of the donor, 
worries about exploitation of women through surrogacy and the interests of otherwise childless couples; it 
reached, in the absence of Indian legislation, the decision that the surrogate is the legal mother, see Balaz v. 
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have stressed that ‘a sound and secure legislation to deal with a situation created 
by the reproductive science and technology’93 is necessary in order that courts 
can reach well-founded decisions. In the relevant judgments of the ECtHR this 
court focused on human rights, in particular on the children’s right to respect 
for private life (Art. 8 ECHR). At least in cases in which one of the intended 
parents is also the child’s biological parent, the court held, Art. 8 ECHR can be 
infringed by not obtaining recognition under domestic law of the legal parent-
child relationship established abroad94. The German Federal Court of Justice 
for Civil Matters (FCJ) discussed, among other, the guarantee of human dignity, 
Art. 1 para. 1 German Basic Law, in a case in which two male partners sought 
recognition in Germany of their status as parents, which the Superior Court of the 
State of California had confirmed in a legally binding decision for a child which 
had been conceived with the sperm of one of the applicants and anonymously 
donated eggs; the pregnancy had been carried to term by a surrogate mother 
from California95. Recognition, the FCJ held, does not involve an infringement 
against the international public policy doctrine: Provided that it is guaranteed 
that consent to and carrying out of surrogate motherhood are in accordance 
with laws applied by a foreign court which safeguard the voluntary nature of 
the decision made by the surrogate mother to bear the child and after its birth to 
hand it over to the intended parents, the dignity of neither the surrogate mother 
nor the child is violated. By contrast, the dignity of the surrogate mother, the 
FCJ further explained, may in fact be violated if the surrogacy arrangement is 
carried out under circumstances which cast doubt on the voluntary participation 
of the surrogate mother, or if basic procedural guarantees were ignored in the 
foreign court process96. The legal status of a child from a surrogate mother has 
also been the subject matter of a constitutional complaint; however, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) did not accept the case because the plaintiffs 
did not present relevant data concerning the status and role of the surrogate 
mother97. The fact that the FCC thus lacked a basis for an appropriate and legally 
Anand Municipality, LPA 2151/2009 (Gujarat H.C. 2009), http://www.legalcrystal.com/case/747551/jan- 
-balaz-vs-anand- municipality-6-ors.
93 Gujarat High Court, Balaz v Anand Municipality, para 19.
94 Labassee v. France, Appl. No. 65941/11 (2014), Mennesson v France, Appl. No. 65192/11 (2014), hudoc.
echr.coe.int. See also the far reaching decision of an ECHtR Chamber (Second Section) that has been overruled 
by the Grand Chamber Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy, Appl. No. 25358/12 (2015 and 2017), hudoc.echr.
coe.int.
95 Case XII ZB 463/13 (2014), http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de. See also the differentiating decision (against 
the background of Art. 119 para 2d of the Swiss Constitution) of the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, 
5A_748/2014, 54 ff.
96 Case XII ZB 463/13 (2014), http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de, 51.
97 Case 1 BvR 573/12 (2012), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de. The grounds of the decision imply 
that the plaintiffs deliberately avoided presenting certain data because they feared the negative effect the 
information would have.
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convincing decision illustrates the institutional limitations within which court 
decisions always operate.
The way in which embryos are handled in assisted reproduction or in 
embryo and stem cell research is occasionally the subject of court rulings. 
Considering the lack of consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and 
differing regulations in the member States of the Council of Europe, the ECtHR is 
exercising restraint: It explicates that it is not advisable for the Court to intervene 
in the debate as to who is a person and when life begins and that the issue 
of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation that 
member States enjoy98. Quite controversial was the judgment in the case of 
Parillo v. Italy99. Due to legal prohibitions, the applicant was precluded from 
donating cryopreserved embryos to scientific research after her partner´s 
death. The majority of the Grand Chamber held that the aim of protecting the 
“embryo´s potential for life” as well as “morals and the rights and freedoms of 
others” was legitimate and that, against the background of the “delicate moral 
and ethical questions” and the lack of European consensus, the legal ban did 
not overstep the margin of appreciation100. Prior to this, however, it argued 
that the right to respect for private life encompasses the applicant´s ability to 
exercise a conscious and considered choice regarding the fate of the embryos 
– a point of view some of the concurring, partly concurring, partly dissenting 
and dissenting opinions resolutely rejected on grounds of the respect for human 
dignity embryos should enjoy101.
In France, the Constitutional Council handed down its decision in 1994 
on referrals for review of the constitutionality of the Respect for the Human 
Body Act and the Donation and Use of Parts and Products of the Human Body, 
Medically Assisted Reproduction and Prenatal Diagnosis Act102. This statute 
allowed, under specific conditions and precautions, for instance, the use of 
particular techniques of artificial reproduction, the selection of embryos to 
be implanted, donation of surplus embryos to other couples and termination 
of the preservation of such embryos after at least five years of storage. The 
Constitutional Council recognized the protection of human dignity against 
all forms of enslavement or degradation as a principle having constitutional 
status and as a parameter for review. It then emphasized that the legislature had 
specified various forms of protection in the event of the conception, implantation 
98 Vo v France, Appl. No. 53924/00 (2014) 81 ff.
99 Parillo v Italy, Appl. No. 46470/11 (2015), hudoc.echr.coe.int.
100 Parillo v Italy, Appl. No. 46470/11 (2015), 162 ff.
101 See Parillo v Italy, Appl. No. 46470/11 (2015), 149 ff.; Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, 
31 ff.; Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Casadevall, Ziemele, Power-Forde, De Gaetano and Yudkivska, 4 
ff.; see also the divergent view of Judge Sajó in his Dissenting Opinion.
102 Décision no 94-343/344 DC (1994), www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr.
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and preservation of embryos fertilized in vitro but had advanced the view that 
the principle of respect for human life and of equality was inapplicable and had 
not seen a need to provide for the preservation of all embryos, once formed, 
for all time and under all circumstances. Ultimately, the Constitutional Council 
did not question the provisions on the grounds that it does not have the same 
decision-making powers as Parliament103. It did not identify any provisions or 
principles having constitutional status and applicable to embryo selection that 
address protection of the human genetic heritage104. The German FCC has not 
yet made any decision on the constitutional protection of embryos in vitro. It is 
true that the protection of embryos was at the center of attention in the abortion 
decisions in which the FCC declared:
Wherever human life exists it is entitled to human dignity […]. The 
potential capabilities inherent in human existence from the very beginning are 
adequate to establish human dignity105.
But the court restricted these considerations explicitly to the context and 
the period of pregnancy, and refers to the life developing during pregnancy ‘as a 
human being’106. Even so, human dignity is not acknowledged only in the case 
of those already capable of making autonomous decisions. In the field of genetic 
diagnostics human dignity is occasionally mentioned but rarely discussed in 
detail. At least up until now, practical court rulings have not focused on visions 
of the future involving conceivably genetically transparent human beings, but 
on specific genetic analyses. In cases involving provision of information on 
health prospects to insurance companies, German rulings do not regard human 
dignity as being affected as long as the genome itself is not made the criterion for 
legal disadvantages, but symptoms of an existing sickness and its confirmation 
based on a diagnostic gene test107. Pre-implantation diagnostics was the subject 
of Costa and Pavan v. Italy, a case in which the applicants, both asymptomatic 
carriers of cystic fibrosis, complained that they had no access to PGD for the 
purposes of selecting an embryo unaffected by the disease108. The blanket ban 
on the use of PGD in Italy was justified, among other reasons, with the interest 
in precluding a risk of eugenic selection. The ECtHR ruled that the applicants’ 
desire to conceive a child unaffected by the genetic disease of which they are 
healthy carriers and to use PGD to this end enjoys the protection of Art. 8 ECHR. 
It further found that prohibiting the use of PGD whilst simultaneously permitting 
103 Décision no 94-343/344 DC (1994), www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr, 10.
104 Décision no 94-343/344 DC (1994), www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr, 11.
105 BVerfGE (Decisions of the FCC) 39, 1, 36 ff (1975); 88, 203, 251 ff (1993).
106 BVerfGE 88, 203, 251 f; see also BVerfGE 39, 1, 37.
107 See Case 5 W 220/11-98 (OLG Saarbrücken, 2011, http://www. rechtsprechung.saarland.de/cgi-bin/
rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=sl&nr=3798.
108 Costa and Pavan v Italy, Appl. No. 54270/10 (2012).
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abortion in cases the embryo is affected by the disease violates the right to respect 
for private and family life109. Pre-implantation diagnostics was also the subject 
of an influential decision by the German Federal Court of Justice for Criminal 
Matters, according to which a particular method does not constitute a criminal 
offense as defined by the Embryo Protection Act, and thus cannot be punished110. 
Human dignity is not mentioned in this decision. However, this is attributable 
to the fact that the disputed breadth of what constitutes a criminal offense was 
primarily defined according to the normative principle: ‘No punishment without 
law’111. The admissibility of pre-implantation diagnosis for the purpose of ‘savior 
siblings’ was discussed in a landmark court decision of the Appellate Committee 
of the House of Lords in terms not of human dignity, but of the objection that this 
involves a slippery slope leading to ‘designer babies’ or ‘treating the offspring 
to be born as a commodity’112. The Committee dismissed the appeal against the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s license on the grounds of the 
specific circumstances of the case to be decided, the conditions imposed in the 
license, and the decision-making powers granted to the authority by law.
In the case of genetic diagnostics there are also follow-up questions for 
the courts to answer. These include cases in which incorrect genetic counseling 
of parents led to the birth of a disabled child. The FCC distinguishes between 
considering the existence of a child as tantamount to ‘damage’ to its parents – 
which would breach the human dignity of the child – and the non-detrimental 
assumption that the obligation of the parents to meet the costs of rearing the 
child constitutes damage. The court held that the application of the law on 
compensation, which aims at achieving just distribution of obligations, to 
personal relationships and the imposition of the responsibility for child support 
on the doctor does not lead to any commercialization of the human as a person 
and does not involve any moral stigma of being worthless being attached to the 
child. It further found that the human dignity of the child is also not violated by 
the fact that it could later learn that its birth was to have been prevented. Whether 
or not psychological harm results from this information is not determined by the 
economic relief of the parents as a result of damages payments, but depends on 
the individual parent-child relationship113.
109 Costa and Pavan v Italy, Appl. No. 54270/10 (2012), 52 ff. Meanwhile, the Italian Constitutional Court has 
decided two similar cases and declared that the relevant provisions of Law no 40 are unconstitutional, see 
Judgment No 96 of 2015, http://www.cortecostituzionale.it.
110 Case 5 StR 386/09 (2010), http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de. The decision was among the causes of an 
amendment of the ESchG with the result that PGD is explicitly permitted under particular circumstances.
111 cf Article 103 para 2 German Basic Law.
112 Quintavalle v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Secretary of State for Health Intervening), 2 A.C. 
561 (2005), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd050428/quint-3.htm.
113 Cases 1 BvR 479/92 and 1 BvR 307/94 (1997), BVerfGE 96, 375, 399 ff.
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Because of the limited competences of the European Union, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) only deals with cases in the field of modern 
biotechnologies to a certain extent, and only in connection with certain aspects. 
In the decisions handed down regarding the Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions, however, the ECJ had to interpret Union law in the 
light of the guarantee of human dignity, Art. 1 EU Charter114. The court noted 
that the context and aim of the Directive show that the EU legislature intended 
to exclude any possibility of patentability where respect for human dignity 
could thereby be affected. Against this background it came to the result that 
the concept of ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6 of the Directive 
must be understood in a wide sense and comprises any fertilized human ovum 
and other organisms that have the inherent capacity of developing into a human 
being115. It is striking, though, what lengths the ECJ goes to to formulate its own 
decisions following the legislators’ value judgments.
In the reasons given for court decisions human dignity thus clearly has a 
certain relevance, which also depends upon the circumstances of the particular 
case. Sometimes it is only a vague standard that is merely mentioned in the 
context of a line of argument supported by other considerations. Sometimes it 
becomes clear that a legal regulation is required which can prevent conceivable 
violations of human dignity. Sometimes it becomes apparent that certain 
behaviors lead to violations of human dignity. The details depend upon the 
particular understanding of human dignity, which has different normative bases 
in different legal systems. At the same time, it can be seen that the courts are 
usually (not always) inclined to exercise restraint in applying the guarantee of 
human dignity. This has to do with its status and weight, with the fact that where 
statutory rules are absent, courts have difficulty reaching a decision and try to 
base their judgments on broad-based grounds, and is related to the fact that 
if a legal framework exists, several lines of justification can be drawn upon 
by the courts in their findings. However, courts decide concrete cases with a 
focus on individual rights and legal entitlements at a later point in time than the 
passage of laws. Circumstances of the cases to decide, the focus on complaints 
and individual rights or new scientific developments may result in significant 
rulings which then trigger legal change, public debate or legislative proposals. 
Nevertheless, in court decisions human dignity plays a lesser role than in public 
and parliamentary debates or in scholarly discourse.
114 Case C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V. (2011); Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (2014), 
both accessible under curia.europa.eu.
115 Case C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace e.V. (2011), 24 ff. Shortly after the Brüstle-decision the ECJ had to deal 
with the question what was meant by being ‘capable of commencing the process of development of a human 
being just as an embryo created by fertilisation of an ovum can do so’ and whether a non-fertilised human 
ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis really fulfils that 
condition, see Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (2014) 21 ff.
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d. dIgnIty In scIentIfIc ApproAches
Jurisprudence understands human dignity in a specifically scholarly 
and by its very nature varied way. It can be text-oriented and unfold human 
dignity as a normative measure embedded in catalogues of human rights from 
a doctrinal point of view. It can analyze the verdicts of courts that use human 
dignity in their reasoning, strive to guide in methodological terms the way in 
which ‘correct’ decisions are reached and then assess case law on this basis. It 
can also go beyond texts or decisions and focus on, for example, foundations of 
human dignity with approaches offered by other disciplines in mind. Hence, the 
context of a particular line of thought must be taken into account.
However, even in terms of specifying duties or rights to be derived from 
the guarantee of human dignity established in a legal text the spectrum of 
scientific approaches has always been broad and heterogeneous. For a long time, 
identifying those who enjoy the protection of human dignity was less problematic 
than defining what was to be protected. Against the background of differing 
theoretical foundations and differing legal texts approaches to delineating the 
contents of the obligation or right are very diverse. The guarantee of human 
dignity is interpreted as the basis of rights, as the right to have rights116, or as a 
principle assisting the further explication of a catalogue of rights generated by 
the principle. When seen as being a right with specific content, human dignity 
is understood, e.g., as an inner transcendental kernel or as a person’s intrinsic 
value as a human being, as a basis for autonomy, as the potential of every 
human being to lead a life marked by self-respect and respect by others, as the 
capabilities required for performing central human functions or with regard to 
Kantian ideas that a human being should always be treated as an end and never 
as a mere means and should neither be made an object nor instrumentalized. 
According to the ‘object formula’ which is of considerable significance in 
Germany, ‘human dignity as such is infringed whenever a concrete person is 
degraded to an object, a mere means, a fungible element’117. However, due to 
its tautologous approach118 the object formula elucidates neither what human 
dignity is nor how it can be violated. Its contribution is to be found in the fact 
116 cf with regard to Hannah Arendt C Menke, ‘Dignity as the Right to Have Rights: Human Dignity in Hannah 
Arendt’ in M Düwell, J Braarvig, R Brownsword and D Mieth (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Human 
Dignity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 332 ff.
117 G Dürig, ‘Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde’ (1956) 81 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 117, 127. 
It would be a misunderstanding of the ‘object formula’ to judge the question of ‘degradation’ solely in terms of 
the motivation of the violator or of the State; the matter must rather be examined from an objective viewpoint 
while considering all circumstances at hand.
118 The concept which is to be defined is already contained in the definition as a prerequisite, see the above 
cited object formula in German: ‘Die Menschen würde als solche ist getroffen, wenn der konkrete Mensch 
zum Objekt, zu einem bloßen Mittel, zur vertretbaren Größe herabgewürdigt wird’, G Dürig, ‘Grundrechtssatz’ 
(n. 117), 127.
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that ‘human dignity’ is not understood as a characteristic of human beings, but 
in terms of potential forms of violation. Human dignity is a relational concept. 
It is worked out in a similar manner when it is concretized with an inductive 
strategy and through exemplification against the background of the experiences 
of elementary injustice and the vulnerability of the individual: Practices are 
identified and categorized which are viewed as breaches of human dignity, 
such as particular encroachments of the individual’s physical and psychological 
integrity as well as forms of social exclusion119. Some debate is centered on 
whether determining a violation of human dignity has occurred is the result of 
weighing this against other legally protected interests or whether human dignity 
resists such relativization120. Other discussions deal with how to concretize the 
multidimensional nature of the guarantee of human dignity: protection against 
impairments, duties to protect, procedural safeguards, horizontal effects121. 
These discourses refer back to the fundamental conceptions, the varying textual 
underpinnings and the heterogeneous content-related ways in which human 
dignity is made concrete.
The advancement of biotechnologies results in scientific approaches and 
arguments having to be readdressed in discourse and questions having to be 
posed in a new or a more salient way. As to legal-philosophical foundations, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to found human dignity solely on being human. 
The self-evident manner in how it had previously been possible to assume a 
common understanding, to a certain extent, of what characterizes the ‘human 
being’ and how to construct human boundaries is clearly disintegrating. As to 
the understanding of human dignity as a general principle allowing interpreters 
to derive other particular rights, imaginable scenarios, such as extensive brain 
intervention, require answers whether and how this principle enables the 
119 See the contributions in P Kaufmann, H Kuch, C Neuhäuser and E Webster (eds), Humiliation, Degradation, 
Dehumanization. Human Dignity Violated (Dordrecht et al, Springer, 2011), and in A Masferrer and E Garcia- 
-Sánchez (eds), Human Dignity of the Vulnerable in the Age of Rights (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New 
York, Springer, 2016). Cf also O Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept’ (1983) 77 American 
Journal of International Law 848, 852; J von Bernstorff, ‘Der Streit um die Menschenwürde im Grundund 
Menschenrechtsschutz: Eine Verteidigung des Absoluten als Grenze und Auftrag’ (2013) JuristenZeitung 905, 
908 ff; A Pollmann, ‘Human Rights Beyond Naturalism’ in M Albers, T Hoffmann and J Reinhardt (eds), 
Human Rights and Human Nature (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, Springer, 2014) 123, 132 f. of the State’ in 
G Nolte (ed), European and US Constitutionalism (Cambridge et al, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 137, 
143 ff.
120 See, eg, J von Bernstorff, ‘Streit’ (n. 119), 905 ff.
121 cf M Mahlmann, ‘Human Dignity and Autonomy in Modern Constitutional Orders’ in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 370, 
383 ff. Elaborating the background and characteristics of the State’s duty to protect (with regard to German 
constitutional law) D Grimm, ‘The Protective Function See JC Bublitz, ‘My Mind Is Mine!? Cognitive Liberty 
as a Legal Concept’ in E Hildt and AG Franke (eds), Cognitive Enhancement. An Interdisciplinary Perspective 
(Dordrecht, Springer, 2013) 233, 241 ff; BJ Koops, ‘Concerning “Humans” and “Human” Rights. Human 
Enhancement from the Perspective of Fundamental Rights’ in BJ Koops, CH Lüthi, A Nelis, C Sieburgh, JPM 
Jansen and MS Schmid (eds), Engineering the Human. Human Enhancement Between Fiction and Fascination 
(Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer, 2013) 165, 174 ff; Albers, ‘Grundrechtsschutz’ (n. 37), 82 ff.
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development of completely new kinds of liberties or rights, for example, cognitive 
liberty or rights to mental integrity, to emotions or to forget122. Regarding the 
questions who is protected by human dignity and who is a bearer of rights, the 
answers are no longer relatively clear cut but instead subject to greater and 
greater difficulties. Ever since artificial reproduction and in-vitro fertilization 
have made embryos available outside the mother’s body, the question of at 
what point in human development does protection set in is being answered 
in a heterogeneous way. The spectrum of development phases being used to 
define the point where the protection of human dignity begins extends from 
early cell stages to nidation all the way to birth. However, fertilized ova and 
embryos are at least entities whose fundamental quality as ‘human life’ is not in 
question. But biotechnological advances in reprogramming cells or suppressing 
a particular development potential are increasingly blurring the boundaries123. 
Future visions of genetically and radically altered human beings, human- 
-machine beings, chimeras or artificially constructed living beings also prompt 
debate over whether and under what circumstances human dignity includes or 
can be transferred to such beings124 or whether and under what circumstances 
it, conversely, prohibits their development.
Due to these and other challenges, a more precise answer must also be 
formulated regarding what exact interests or rights worthy of protection actually 
merit protection on the grounds of human dignity and what can be classified 
as being a violation of those rights or interests. Here, approaches must contend 
with the problem that the interests helpful in making human dignity concrete 
must themselves be carefully thought through again. This is compounded by the 
problem that partly conceptual and partly empirical aspects are involved, but 
that quite a few empirical assumptions are uncertain and cannot be researched 
ex ante. For example, is cloning a problem of human dignity with a view to 
the cloned person because he or she would not enjoy sufficient autonomy as 
a ‘copy’ of someone else, or do such assumptions involve inadmissible genetic 
determinism? What are ‘dignity’ and ‘autonomy’ against the background of the 
122 See JC Bublitz, ‘My Mind Is Mine!? Cognitive Liberty as a Legal Concept’ in E Hildt and AG Franke (eds), 
Cognitive Enhancement. An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Dordrecht, Springer, 2013) 233, 241 ff; BJ Koops, 
‘Concerning “Humans” and “Human” Rights. Human Enhancement from the Perspective of Fundamental 
Rights’ in BJ Koops, CH Lüthi, A Nelis, C Sieburgh, JPM Jansen and MS Schmid (eds), Engineering the 
Human. Human Enhancement Between Fiction and Fascination (Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer, 2013) 165, 174 
ff; Albers, ‘Grundrechtsschutz’ (n. 37), 82 ff.
123 By no means is the problem resolved by emphasizing that statements based on natural sciences and legal 
statements must be separated and that latter must be supported on their own, see for such an approach 
Böckenförde, ‘Menschen-würde’ (n. 20), 810 ff. For despite the fact that they can be differentiated analytically, 
both forms of statements are intertwined in many ways in concrete assessments.
124 N Bostrom, ‘In Defense of Posthuman Dignity’ in GR Hansell and W Grassie (eds), H +/Transhumanism and 
Its Critics (Philadelphia, Metanexus, 2011) 55 ff, 61 ff; MC Gruber, “Menschenwürde” – Menschlichkeit als 
Bedingung der Würde?‘ in H Baranzke and G Duttge (eds), Autonomie und Würde (Würzburg, Königshausen 
& Neumann, 2014) 417, 417 ff; cf also Koops, ‘Concerning “Humans”’ (n. 122), 179 f.
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findings of brain research? Do these concepts, in the realm of human rights, have 
to be linked to a ‘natural’ person or how far do limits and descriptions change, 
for instance, in the case of human-machine combinations? Is dignity achieved in 
evaluations and decisions made by the individual person and does it therefore 
encompass any voluntarily chosen use of new technologies for ‘enhancement’, 
or is it an objectified concept that does not privilege persons own understanding 
at any rate and under certain circumstances can dispute such decisions?125 
Moreover, with the advent of biotechniques and their potential for intervention 
the very question arises whether there is a concept of human species which 
expresses the interest in preserving certain features of the human life-form and 
which provides underlying presuppositions for human dignity. Approaches to 
this question are manifold, answers divergent126.
Legal considerations respond to these challenges, among other ways, by 
constructing the form, statements and effects of legal norms and rights anew. For 
example, objective legal statements and individual rights are differentiated and 
decoupled from each other in such a way that not every objective legal statement 
has a corresponding individual right the protected person can enforce. The 
duties following from the objective legal guarantee of human dignity can then 
be broken down in many ways and, if necessary, be tailored to new problems. 
The construct of an advance objective protection, for instance, attempts to solve 
the problem arising when the protection of human dignity shall be applied to 
human beings who do not yet exist. In the case of reproductive cloning, the 
protection of human dignity would comprise the cloned person and be effective 
before the protected person exists, since it would apply to the act which produces 
him or her as a clone127. In the constructions of individual rights, proposals such 
as that of giving a remainder interest to the embryo seek to model protection 
125 For this debate see Albers, ‘Enhancement’ (n. 50), 235 ff.
126 Sometimes the concept of a dignity of the human species is not substantiated and introduced to justify 
prohibitions in an overall manner, see, eg, J Isensee, ‘Die alten Grundrechte und die biotechnische Revolution’ 
in J Bohnert, C Gramm, U Kindhäuser, J Lege, A Rinken and G Robbers (eds), Verfassung – Philosophie – 
Kirche (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2001) 243, 253 f, 261 f. In a more elaborated way, the concept aims 
at preserving an ‘ethical selfunderstanding of the species which is crucial for our capacity to see ourselves as 
the authors of our own life histories, and to recognize one another as autonomous persons’, see J Habermas, 
The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003) 25. Cf also D Grimm, ‘Das Grundgesetz nach 
vierzig Jahren’ (1989) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1305, 1310; Meiser, Biopatentierung (2006) 93 ff; R 
Andorno, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights as a Common Ground for a Global Bioethics’ (2009) 34 Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy 223; M Nettesheim, ‘Biotechnology and the Guarantee of Human Dignity’ in S 
Elm and SN Willich (eds) Quo Vadis Medical Healing (Dordrecht, Springer, 2009) 143, 162 ff. For critical 
considerations see, eg, T Gutmann,
 “Gattungsethik” als Grenze der Verfügung des Menschen über sich selbst?’ in W van den Daele (ed), Biopolitik 
(Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005) 235, 242 ff.
127 See, eg, H Rosenau, ‚Reproduktives und therapeutisches Klonen‘ in K Amelung, W Beulke, H Lilie, H Rüping, 
H Rosenau and G Wolfslast (eds), Strafrecht, Biorecht, Rechtsphilosophie (Heidelberg, C.F. Müller, 2003) 
761, 767, 776 ff.
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understood as gradual and increasing protection in the different developmental 
stages of the embryo by using an appropriate legal construct128.
As a result, the scientific approaches to human dignity are becoming 
even more multifaceted because of the biotechnological challenges. To some 
extent, they contradict and compete with each other. Considering their self- 
-understanding and their convincibility, they must aim at internal consistency. 
From the perspective of each particular approach, diverging approaches are 
mutually irreconcilable. From an external perspective, however, that does not 
pose an insurmountable problem. Scientific approaches are not integrated 
within non-academic contexts directly and without change; they are always 
modified when being used in societal, political or judicial communication.
III – CONTExTUALIZING AND DIFFERENTIATING HUMAN DIGNITY
Biotechnologies have proven to be a productive field of reference for 
discourse about human dignity and the resulting need to contextualize and 
differentiate the concept of human dignity becomes clearly evident. The more 
that, over time and upon closer examination, ‘the’ biotechnologies differentiate 
into numerous fields as well as into a broad spectrum of applications and 
the more nuanced their consequences, both actually observed and potential, 
are described, the more sophisticated levels, reference points and patterns 
of argumentation in connection with human dignity are fleshed out. The 
multifaceted nature of the technologies forces to make arguments related to 
human dignity more precise. It is no objection that it is not always entirely 
clear exactly what the features of biotechnology are or what is problematic 
about them; on the contrary, this is a driving power in the debate. Considered 
as a whole, discourse about biotechnologies in the various fields provides a 
substantial contribution to sharpening understanding of human dignity with 
regard to contexts (A.), functions (B.) or legal constructions (C.). Human dignity 
is by no means a useless concept.
A. contexts
Human dignity is discussed in many fields: in society in general, in the 
political and in the legal system as well as in various scientific disciplines. The 
idea plays different roles in different contexts, and the particular actors involved 
contribute in their own ways to how it is understood. To a certain extent, its 
meaning is shaped by the particular context in which it is used. Of course, 
there are also interactions. Especially in the area of biotechnology, the juridical 
conceptualization of human dignity has been a topic of discourse throughout 
128 Jofer, Regulierung (n. 17) 410 ff.
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society, and the attractiveness of human dignity as an argument derives not least 
from the fact that the public is quite familiar with its legal value. Social discourse 
in various legal systems even differ according to whether human dignity simply 
has high legal value or whether it goes even further and is considered ‘inviolable’ 
in the sense of ‘indefeasible’ or ‘untouchable’ (‘unantastbar’). For example, in 
contrast to the United States, questions of informed consent in connection with 
biobanks are being discussed in Germany – where the Basic Law enshrines the 
indefeasibility of human dignity – as a problem in terms of personality rights129, 
but regularly not as a problem of human dignity.
When human dignity is used in a legal context, its meaning is shaped by 
the specific legal environment. Even if the idea has theological or philosophical 
roots, it is detached from them to a certain extent due to its being transferred to a 
legal context. Its legal meaning is the result of autonomous legal communication 
processes130. Communication contexts within the legal system are, in their 
turn, diverse. As this analysis has illustrated, a rough distinction can be drawn 
between legislation, jurisdiction and jurisprudence. Lawmaking procedures aim 
at establishing legal rules through procedures that ensure acceptance. In this 
way they are, to a certain extent, linked to public discourse. They are carried 
out at the various levels at which norms operate: as procedures for working 
out an international declaration or convention, as procedures for establishing 
a constitution, or as legislative procedures. Human dignity can be decisive 
as a norm or an argument in lawmaking procedures and/or be enshrined 
as a normative standard in the outcome of the norm-setting procedure. 
Lawmaking procedures and established legal standards can be interlinked due 
to the interdependencies between norms and their to some extent hierarchical 
relationship to each other: The enshrinement of human dignity as the result 
of a declaration or of the adoption of a constitution affects national legislative 
procedures in which the provisions of the declaration or constitution exert their 
influence, whether as soft law or as a binding standard, and are used as an 
argument in debates. Courts refer to human dignity in the context of decisions 
on particular cases. As courts are established at different levels and decide 
in different kind of judicial procedures, the court involved and the particular 
procedure determine the role human dignity plays as a normative measure. In 
the case of constitutional courts, the only standard is the constitution; human 
dignity may be relevant as an objective norm or as an individual right. Other 
courts apply constitutional standards such as human dignity only by also taking 
129 Personality rights are derived from Article 2 para 1 in conjunction with Article 1 para 1 of the Basic Law. 
The right to freely develop one’s personality, Article 2 I of the Basic Law, is the guiding norm. Hence, 
personality rights do not enjoy the same legal value as human dignity; they are, for example, subject to limiting 
reservations.
130 See Grimm, ‘Dignity’ (n. 72), 381 ff, 384.
DPU Nº 82 – Jul-Ago/2018 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL – DOUTRINA .............................................................................................................45 
RDU, Porto Alegre, Volume 15, n. 82, 2018, 9-49, jul-ago 2018
account of legal norms below the level of the constitution. The analysis of the 
use of human dignity in the reasoning of courts has shown that courts, as a rule, 
try to base their decisions not on references to human dignity alone, and that 
they depend, to a certain extent, on legislative guidelines or frameworks when 
addressing the challenges of biotechnologies. In view of the prospect of as yet 
unspecified future cases courts are not willing to commit themselves fully to 
a particular theory or foundation of human dignity but, on the contrary, keep 
their options open. In contrast, jurisprudence deals with human dignity in a 
specifically scholarly way. Profundity and consistency are quality standards that 
require the selection of a particular theoretical framework. Scientific approaches 
do not need to focus on embodiments of human dignity in texts, but instead can 
explore foundations or arguments offered by other disciplines. They are by their 
very nature varied.
Legislation, jurisdiction and jurisprudence differ from each other not 
simply on the basis of the distinction between theory and practice, but also 
through the forms of their own independent institutional contexts. The meaning 
of human dignity does not completely change when it is used in different 
contexts; however, as a result of its own internal differentiations, the legal 
system does not offer a uniform understanding of human dignity, but instead a 
multifaceted one.
b. functIons
Any description of functions depends on approaches, frameworks and 
perspectives. The use of human dignity in lawmaking or judicial procedures can 
be analyzed, for instance, from a sociological or political sciences’ point of view 
with emphasis on the function a multi-faceted and ambiguous normative measure 
such as human dignity plays in ‘keeping rival constituencies on board’131 or in 
shifting power to courts. From a metaperspective, the function of the guarantee 
of human dignity can be seen in offering a basis for ongoing specification and 
reflection of descriptions how the human should be understood. This function 
is stimulated by the high rank of human dignity and by follow-up questions like 
the problem of universalizability of basic values and rights.
As to legal points of view, jurisprudential analyses comprise a wide 
variety of different approaches. Among other problems, although by no means 
exclusively, they contend with questions of how normative measures are to be 
interpreted in a methodologically well-founded manner. Against the background 
of concepts of the division of power, they might be especially interested in 
examining the capacity of the legally established guarantee of human dignity 
131 Caulfield and Brownsword, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 30), 75.
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to guide regulators and to constrain judicial decision-making. Traditional 
hierarchical models and ideas of ‘steering’ in the sense that courts merely 
subsume their cases under legal provisions, however, have in the meantime been 
superseded by more complex conceptions of how law functions. In addition, it 
is part of jurisprudential research interests to analyze, for instance, what legal 
concepts are suitable for putting the normatively desired influence of the public 
on legislative decisions into practice, or whether the guarantee of human dignity 
is, precisely because of its ambiguity and rich implications, helpful for courts 
to decide cases involving particular challenges of biotechnologies, whether in 
a situation where statutory rules do not yet exist, or at a later point in time than 
when laws have been enacted. Functional analyses will, in accordance with 
their particular approach, come to different results: they may highlight the role 
the guarantee of human dignity plays for the understanding and enforcement of 
individual rights as well as for satisfying particular protection needs or criticize 
that this guarantee fails in giving a clear guidance, ‘may obscure the real 
rationales for, and the lack of consensus about, a given policy approach’132 or 
‘is used by courts as a licence to illegitimately overrule democratic authority’133. 
However, even from a legal point of view, human dignity as a normative 
concept or as a normative measure is by no means in any respect unsuitable just 
because it is characterized by disparate traditions, by a heuristic character134, by 
a ‘remarkable plasticity’135, by specific needs for concretization and by a relative 
openness to different interpretations.
The results of this article also show that the guarantee of human dignity 
does not lead to completely arbitrary outcomes. Quite the contrary, there is 
widespread consensus about the prohibition of, for instance, enslaving women 
for the purpose of forced surrogate motherhood, breeding human clones that are 
deliberately stunted to do inferior works, intervening in the brain of a person to 
gain complete external control or admitting a product patent on a human being. 
As far as there are disagreements on many matters, the results of this article 
have elucidated that, from a functional point of view, exactly the ‘paradoxical 
nature’136 of the guarantee of human dignity might explain its capacities. And 
132 T Caulfield, ‘Stem Cells, Clones, Consensus, and the Law’ in LP Knowles and GE Kaebnick (eds), Reprogenetics. 
Law, Policy and Ethical Issues (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2007) 105, 113 ff.
133 M Rosen, ‘Dignity: The Case Against’ in C McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 143, 152.
134 C Dupré, The Age of Dignity. Human Rights and Constitutionalim in Europe
 (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016) 16 f.
135 Botha, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 71), 217.
136 Botha, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 71), 173, 217 ff: ‘Dignity is seen as a matter of cosmopolitan right […] and yet 
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person. At the same time, it institutes uncertainty by recognising each individual as a unique, selflegislating 
DPU Nº 82 – Jul-Ago/2018 – ASSUNTO ESPECIAL – DOUTRINA .............................................................................................................47 
RDU, Porto Alegre, Volume 15, n. 82, 2018, 9-49, jul-ago 2018
even when human dignity is firmly anchored as ‘inviolable’, it does not present 
itself as an unchangeable conceptual complex. Biotechnologies are developing, 
social contexts are changing, in some respects empirical experience is 
accumulating. Understanding of human dignity is developing along with these, 
without becoming arbitrary as a result.
c. legAl constructs
The guarantee of human dignity is enshrined in a series of legal 
documents, and the forms of text vary, as do the status and role of the various 
documents. How human dignity is to be understood and what legal effects 
are linked with it has to be determined in a relatively independent way in the 
context of a particular document. Interpreting legal guarantees does not stop at 
simply working out the meaning of texts but also involves and relies on doctrinal 
systems that can be described as a storehouse of knowledge which consists of, 
among others, structures, constituent elements and correlations derived from 
legal or supralegal concepts and to which science, legislation or court rulings 
contribute137. For instance, objective legal statements and individual rights have 
to be differentiated as well as the legal requirements and legal effects laid down 
in a provision; additionally, several dimensions of protection can be worked 
out, such as the protection against impairments, duties to protect or horizontal 
effects. Hence, appropriate legal responses to social conflicts or new challenges 
are not only reached by defining the contents of a legal guarantee or the bearer 
of a right but also by developing a variety of legal constructs and sophisticated 
legal architectures.
This article has pointed out that, although there have been manifold 
approaches ever since the legal protection of human dignity was established, 
the advancement of biotechnologies and their consequences have given rise 
to an even richer and more highly differentiated diversity of contents and legal 
constructs. For example, the construct of an advance objective protection 
derived from the guarantee of human dignity seeks to protect human beings 
who do not yet exist. Deliberations such as that of giving a remainder interest to 
embryos aim at introducing an appropriate legal construct to reflect a gradual 
and increasing protection in the different developmental stages of embryos. 
Some proposals understand the guarantee of human dignity as a bundle of rights 
that can be divided into separate elements in order to apply one part or another 
to artificial entities. Other approaches emphasize that the objective protection 
of human dignity does not refer to the individual alone, but also to human 
human being, who has the moral right to question received interpretations and to challenge the normative 
closure […].’
137 More thoroughly Albers, ‘Rechtsfindung’ (n. 85), 260 ff.
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species. Only infrequently this is meant in the sense that the ‘species’ as such 
enjoys the protection of dignity so that ‘human nature’ must not be altered. More 
convincing than such a thesis – which leads to unsolvable difficulties of how to 
find appropriate criteria for defining human ‘species’ or ‘human nature’ – is the 
assumption that there is a concept of human species which provides underlying 
preconditions for human dignity as a normative idea and which expresses the 
interest in preserving these preconditions. Such a content-related concept is 
needed, for instance, for delineating those living beings that are protected by 
human dignity. It is also needed for applying the protection of human dignity to 
human beings who do not yet exist and for preventing imaginable developments 
such as the breeding of people with brain functioning restricted by gene 
technology for carrying out lowlevel work. Many other thinkable constellations, 
though, involve grey zones and finding appropriate answers to them poses 
new challenges. As a human right that has to be acknowledged and therefore 
inherently possesses supra-individual values the guarantee of human dignity 
necessarily goes beyond the individual and transcends individual rights while 
moving the individual into the center of protection and ensuring that not only 
his or her interests but also his or her self-understanding of dignity and his or her 
autonomy are normatively relevant. This reflects once again the ‘paradoxical 
nature’138 of the guarantee of human dignity and leads to the conclusion that, 
although species-related arguments might be used for limiting the decisions 
of the individual, the normative idea of human species, in turn, is relatively 
variable.
With the development of biotechnologies and the resulting gray areas 
concerning what a human being is and when a living creature can be said to be 
human, the image of human dignity as a human being’s inner kernel or intrinsic 
value considered self-evident loses its fundamental basis. More convincing is 
approaching ‘human dignity’ not in a way as if it were a characteristic of human 
beings, but as a relational concept and with a view to social relationships and 
potential forms of violation. But if we interpret the guarantee of human dignity 
as a human right that bases on experiences of human vulnerability how can it be 
handled when we move to biotechnical prospects and new areas characterized 
by a high level of uncertainties and when the human is subject to transformation 
and transgression in an unprecedented manner? The description of ‘experiences 
of human vulnerability’ – of course always a mixture of hindsight and foresight 
when used in the context of human dignity violations – will have to focus more 
on foresight than on hindsight. To a substantial extent, the effects and risks 
of biotechnologies refer to an unknown future, and the present constructions 
of this future which are continuously being made have to take uncertainties 
138 Botha, ‘Human dignity’ (n. 71), 173, 217.
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and the unknown, i.e., the constantly generated reverse of knowledge, into 
consideration139. Legal constructions must respond to such challenges by 
developing forms of proceduralization of law and legally guided decision- 
-making140. The legal effects of the guarantee of human dignity are not restricted 
to prohibiting certain behaviors or to simple ‘Yes/No’ decisions. In the course 
of being elaborated in a more differentiated way, these legal effects can extend 
to providing normative standards such as legislative duties to observe the effects 
of and to rethink the regulatory approaches chosen or duties to implement risk 
assessment and evaluation procedures. Considering social and technological 
change and knowledge or experiences over time, the concrete measures the 
guarantee of human dignity provides must be regarded as being, to a certain 
extent, in flux, too141. Once again, this guarantee proves to be far from consisting 
of static statements only.
IV – OUTLOOk
As biotechnologies and the societal discourse on them develop the notion 
of the guarantee of human dignity is becoming increasingly differentiated. 
Human dignity does not turn out to be a useless concept142. Likewise, it is not 
‘little other than an umbrella term’143 or reducible to a mere placeholder for 
other interests such as autonomy or equal respect. Faced with the potential of 
advanced biotechnologies for bringing about radical transformations, we need 
human dignity as a concept forcing us to continuously specify and reflect upon 
what constitutes being human. This is supported by the fact that the idea of 
human dignity is probably more obviously than ever before a social construction 
as well as an extraordinarily complex legal concept.
139 cf Albers, ‘Bioethik, Biopolitik, Biorecht’ (n. 77), 32 ff.
140 See in more detail M Albers, ‘Risikoregulierung im Bio-, Gesundheitsund Medizinrecht’ in id (ed), 
Risikoregulierung im Bio-, Gesundheitsund Medizinrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011) 13 ff.
141 This has nothing to do with a weighing or balancing of interests which is a specific form of relativizing the 
protection of the guarantee of human dignity – a relativization human dignity is exempted from in case it is 
established as being ‘indefeasible (unantastbar)’.
142 See, however, R Macklin, ‘Dignity Is a Useless Concept’ (2003) 327 British Medical Journal, 1419 f. 
Nevertheless, it is true that more precision is required than simply asserting that human dignity is violated.
143 cf U Schüklenk and A Pacholczyk, ‘Dignity’s Wooly Uplift’ (2010) 24 Bioethics ii (in the context of patients’ 
needs where claiming ‘human dignity’, indeed, often might sum up various patients’ needs that have to be 
concretized).
